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TAXING INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS USING A
SIMPLIFIED MARK-TO-MARKET APPROACH
Samuel D. Brunson*
INTRODUCTION
In the throes of the worst recession since the Great Depression,'
private investment funds (such as hedge funds and private equity
funds) find themselves alternately vilified and lionized.2 One day,
hedge funds are accused of causing systemic risk. The next, their
high-frequency trading is credited with adding liquidity and
stability to the stock market.' Some see hedge funds as rip-off
artists, out to fleece investors (and, incidentally, to wreak havoc on
non-investors), while others see them as an "oasis" in the world of
Bernie Madoff and huge portfolio losses.5
It seems strange that investment funds could elicit such visceral
but opposing reactions. After all, an investment fund is just a
privately owned investment vehicle through which (wealthy) people
can pool their money and have it invested by a professional
investment fund manager. But with an estimated $2 trillion
invested in hedge funds alone at the beginning of 2008, there is a
* Assistant Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I would
like to thank John Bronsteen, Victor Fleischer, Jeffrey Kwall, Adam
Rosenzweig, and Spencer Waller for their insightful comments on earlier drafts
of this Article.
1. Edmund L. Andrews, Forget Aloof, Bernanke Goes Barnstorming, N.Y.
TimEs, July 27, 2009, at Al.
2. Note that when this Article refers to investment funds, it is referring to
private and unregulated investment funds, including hedge funds and private
equity funds as well as certain real-estate partnerships, but is not referring to
mutual funds or any other investment fund regulated by the U.S. government.
3. Chris Dillow, Why Aren't Hedge Funds Failing as Fast as Banks?, TiMES
(London), Sept. 17, 2008, at 32 ("Before the credit crunch started, countless
experts warned us that hedge funds were a source of 'systemic risk'. They were
wrong.").
4. In Praise of Fast Trades, N.Y. TimES DEALBOOK, Aug. 3, 2009,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/03/in-praise-of-fast-trades/ ("Rather
than destabilizing the markets, Mr. Niederauer said, high-frequency trading
adds liquidity to the marketplace and so probably does the opposite, reducing
market volatility."). But see Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Rewarding Bad Actors,
N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 3, 2009, at A21.
5. Louise Story, Just a Little off the Top, N.Y. TImES, Mar. 25, 2009, at Bl.
6. See Louise Story, Hedge Funds, Unhinged, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 18, 2009,
at BUL.
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popular perception that when an investment fund sneezes, the
markets catch a cold.
The same sense of irreconcilable duality that exists as to
whether investment funds are good or evil also plays out in
discussions of the taxation of investment fund managers." A large
portion of an investment fund manager's income is paid in the form
of "carried interest." Carried interest is an investment fund
manager's principal ownership interest in an investment fund. The
investment fund manager receives carried interest in exchange for
her work managing the fund, not in exchange for contributing
money to the fund. The carried interest entitles the investment
fund manager to a portion of the fund's profits; although the
percentage can vary, depending on the particular investment fund,
investment fund managers generally receive a 20% share of the
investment fund's profits as their carried interest.9
Generally, compensation is treated as ordinary income for tax
purposes, taxable at a maximum marginal rate of 35%.1o But
because investment funds are generally treated as partnerships for
tax purposes, under current law the carried interest is treated as
7. This may not be the case in the current economic downturn. See supra
note 3. But the fear certainly is not unfounded. In 1998, the collapse of the
hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management nearly paralyzed the banking
system, and the find had to be bailed out. See, e.g., Tyler Cowen, Was an Old
Bailout a Bad Precedent?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2008, at BU5 ("The financial
crisis is a result of many bad decisions, but one of them hasn't received enough
attention: the 1998 bailout of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge
fund."); Joe Nocera, Hedge Fund Manager's Farewell, N.Y. TIMEs, May 16, 2009,
at B1 ("They still remembered Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund
that a decade earlier had, indeed, brought the financial system to the brink
because of its extreme leverage.").
8. See Philip F. Postlewaite, Fifteen and Thirty Five-Class Warfare in
Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code: The Taxation of Human Capital
upon the Receipt of a Proprietary Interest in a Business Enterprise, 28 VA. TAX
REV. 817, 851 (2009) ("If the intent is to prevent excessive benefits for the super
rich, thereby targeting investment structures solely on the size of the return,
the goal must be questioned. . . . However, if the concern is broader, i.e., the
proper theoretical taxation of a compensatory receipt of a profits interest in a
partnership, such concerns arise with respect to any receipt of a profits
interest.").
9. See Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer,
7 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 323, 346 (2007).
10. I.R.C. § 1(a), (i)(2) (2006). After 2010, the maximum tax rate is set to
revert to its pre-2001 level of 39.6% unless Congress extends the lower rates
currently in place. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901(a)(1), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). The Obama administration has indicated that
it will allow the top two tax brackets to revert to their higher pre-2001 levels.
Ron Lieber & Tara Siegel Bernard, Braced for a Higher Tax Bill, Some May
Dodge the Bullet, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2009, at Al ("The top two federal income
tax brackets would rise to 36 percent and 39.6 percent from 33 percent and 35
percent, respectively.").
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income from a partnership interest. As income from a partnership
interest, carried interest is taxed to the investment fund manager in
the same manner as it is taxed to the passive investors and is
potentially subject to tax at the 15% long-term capital gains rates."
Investment fund managers can be very handsomely
compensated. In 2006, James Simons, one of the leading investment
fund managers, made $1.7 billion. By way of comparison, Lloyd
Blankfein of Goldman Sachs, the highest-paid Wall Street executive
in 2006, earned $54.3 million.12 That certain very wealthy people
could pay taxes on the majority of their income at a 15% rate
seemed intuitively unfair; even the very wealthy seemed to
understand the intuitive unfairness. Warren Buffett said that it
was wrong that investment fund managers could pay taxes at a
lower rate "than our receptionists do or our cleaning ladies." And
Representative Sander Levin, among others, has introduced
legislation to raise taxes on carried interest, not, he asserts, in order
"to soak the rich," but "to find tax equity."4
Investment fund managers reply that carried interest should
continue to be taxed at capital gains rates." They argue that
carried interest is capital gain, not compensation income, and
should be treated as such.' 6  Furthermore, they argue that
increasing the tax on carried interest will decrease investment fund
managers' appetite for long-term risky investments and that raising
the taxes on carried interest will ultimately hurt economic growth in
the United States." Some legislators argue that ultimately, raising
taxes on carried interest will not just hurt the wealthy, but will hurt
middle-class people too.'
The debate over the appropriate taxation of investment fund
managers has also played out in the academic literature, with some
commentators arguing that the taxation of carried interest needs to
be reformed,' 9 and others arguing that the status quo best reflects
11. Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in
Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2008).
12. Jenny Anderson & Julie Creswell, Make Less Than $240 Million?
You're off Top Hedge Fund List, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 24, 2007, at Al.
13. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Putting a Bull's-Eye on a Tax Loophole, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 10, 2009, at Bl.
14. Jenny Anderson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, 'Tax Equity' Is Battle Cry in
New Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 2007, at C1.
15. Sorkin, supra note 13.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Eric Cantor, Op-Ed., Don't Hike Partnership Taxes, USA TODAY, Dec. 6,
2007, at 17A.
19. See, e.g., No6l B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The Carried
Interest Controversy: Let's Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAx L. REV. 121, 121
(2008); Fleischer, supra note 11, at 49; Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter
K: Compensating Service Partners, 48 TAx L. REV. 69, 103 (1992).
81
HeinOnline  -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 81 2010
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
the economics inherent in the allocation of carried interest.20
Generally, the academic analysis has revolved less around the
question of whether it is fair for high-wealth individuals to be taxed
on the bulk of their income at long-term capital gains rates and
more around the question of what, economically, carried interest
most resembles. Supporters of the status quo argue that carried
interest is a risky bet, with little economic difference from the
investments of others in the investment fund." Supporters of
reform argue on the other hand that carried interest most closely
looks like compensation for managing the portfolio22 or like an
interest-free loan from the passive investors to the investment fund
23
manager.
Lost in the back and forth, however, is any significant
discussion of why capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than other
forms of income. Because taxing some income at a 15% rate and
other income at a 35% rate, depending on the income's source,
introduces complexity into the tax code and can affect investment
decisions, preferential tax rates should only be applied where there
is a compelling justification.2 4 Prior to determining whether carried
interest is more like compensation or is more like investment
income, it is valuable to look to the policy justifications for
preferential capital gains rates and to apply those justifications to
carried interest. If the case for taxing capital gains at a lower rate
applies to an investment fund manager's carried interest, then it
would make sense to tax carried interest at the lower rates. If,
however, the case for taxing capital gains at a lower rate does not
apply to carried interest, carried interest should be taxed at
ordinary rates, absent some compelling non-tax justification. If the
underlying tax policy justifying reduced tax rates on capital gains
also applies to carried interest, carried interest should be taxed at
preferential capital gains rates, and it becomes unnecessary to
determine the best economic equivalent. Similarly, if the tax policy
justifications do not apply, carried interest should be taxed at
ordinary rates, and, again, it is unnecessary to determine the closest
economic equivalent.
This Article argues that the policy arguments for taxing capital
gains at lower rates are not compelling when applied to carried
20. See, e.g., Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests: The Reform
That Did Not Happen, 40 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 197, 198 (2009); Matthew A. Melone,
Success Breeds Discontent: Reforming the Taxation of Carried Interests-
Forcing a Square Peg into a Round Hole, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 421, 425 (2008);
Postlewaite, supra note 8, at 821; David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried
Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REv. 715, 715 (2008).
21. See infra Part IV.A.
22. See infra Part IV.B.1.
23. See infra Part TV.B.2.
24. See Daniel Halperin, A Capital Gains Preference Is Not EVEN a
Second-Best Solution, 48 TAXL. REV. 381, 382 (1993).
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interest. Moreover, those arguments that do weakly support taxing
carried interest at long-term capital gains rates can be neutralized
by a simple reform: if investment fund managers were required to
pay taxes on carried interest on a simplified mark-to-market basis-
that is, if investment fund managers were taxed on the amount of
the fund's appreciation allocated to them, whether realized or
unrealized, every year-there would remain no justification for
taxing carried interest at a preferential rate.
This Article will progress in the following manner: Part I will
discuss the structure of investment funds and the types of
compensation investment fund managers receive. Part II will
discuss how carried interest is currently taxed and the bill pending
in Congress that would change the taxation of carried interest. Part
III will discuss the justifications for taxing capital gains at lower
rates than those applicable to ordinary income.
Although analyzing whether policy justifications underlying
preferential tax rates apply to carried interest is enough to decide
whether to tax carried interest at capital or ordinary rates, Part IV
will analyze the arguments regarding economic equivalents of
carried interest. In doing so, this Article will demonstrate that,
even absent the capital gains analysis, the case for treating carried
interest as compensation is as strong as the case for treating it as
investment income. As such, there is not a compelling reason for
taxing carried interest at capital gains rates.
Finally, Part V will lay out in detail the proposal for taxing
investment fund managers on their carried interest on a simplified
mark-to-market basis. This Part will discuss how such taxation
would work, the problems it would solve, and why it would be fair to
investment fund managers and investment fund investors.
I. INVESTMENT FUND BASICS
A. The Structure of an Investment Fund
The structure of investment funds has been laid out in great
detail elsewhere.u Because this Article will focus on the tax
treatment of carried interest, it will only briefly describe the
structure of investment funds. In addition, because concerns about
the taxation of carried interest do not arise in the context of foreign
investment funds, the discussion of investment funds in this Article
25. For a broad explanation of the regulatory and tax structure of
investment funds, see Ordower, supra note 9. For another excellent overview of
investment fund structures, see Melone, supra note 20, at 425-31. I would
disagree with Professor Melone's use of the term "hedge fund" as overbroad to
describe the world of hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds,
and buyout funds. In this Article, I will use the term "investment fund" or
"unregulated investment fund" instead. Aside from that minor terminological
quibble, however, his description of investment funds is right on the money.
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will be limited to those that are treated as partnerships for U.S. tax
26
purposes.
Private investment funds are generally organized as limited
partnerships. 7  Both hedge funds and private equity funds are
investment vehicles in which wealthy investors pool their money in
order to obtain an investment return. Although their structures are
similar, there are certain differences between hedge funds and
private equity funds,28 most of which result from the fact that hedge
funds generally invest in publicly traded securities and other liquid
investments, whereas private equity funds generally make illiquid
investments in private companies. 9 Generally hedge funds require
a significant initial investment from potential investors, while
private equity funds require a significant capital commitment.o
The minimum initial investment or capital commitment can often be
$1 million or more." Once they have put their money into the
investment fund, investors have limited opportunities to withdraw
their money from the fund. Hedge fund investors can generally
26. While there are interesting tax issues that arise in the context of
offshore investment funds, such funds are not structured as partnerships, so
there is no question of their passing through capital gains to the investment
fund manager.
27. See KEITH H. BLACK, MANAGING A HEDGE FUND: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO
TRADING, BUSINEsS STRATEGIES, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATIONS 114
(2004). Although the investment fund manager is the general partner, and thus
retains all liability with respect to the fund, the investment fund manager is
often organized as an entity that has limited liability but has pass-through tax
treatment. Id. at 114-15.
28. For a more general look at differences between hedge funds and private
equity funds, see Adam H. Rosenzweig, Not All Carried Interests Are Created
Equal, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 713, 716-21 (2009).
29. See Douglas Cumming, Andrej Gill & Uwe Walz, International Private
Equity Valuation and Disclosure, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 617, 618-19 (2009).
30. One of the significant differences between hedge funds and private
equity funds is that an investor in a hedge fund puts in all of her money up
front. She can invest more money in the future if she decides to, but she has no
obligation to do so. Private equity investors, on the other hand, commit to
investing a specified amount of money but need not give it to the fund
immediately. Instead, as the investment fund manager finds potential
investments, the manager will "call" a portion of the investors' capital
commitment, at which point investors are obligated to provide the money to the
fund.
31. See, e.g., Riva D. Atlas, A Hedge Play for Anyone with $10,000, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at Cl ("Highbridge typically requires a minimum
investment of $10 million for the fund, and annual fees of 2 percent of assets
and 25 percent of any profits, according to the U.S. Offshore Funds Directory,
which lists the performance of hedge funds."); Saul Hansell, A Primer on Hedge
Funds: Hush-Hush and for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1994, at Al ("If that's
not enough to create the presumption of some sort of conspiracy in the minds of
people who do not have $1 million required for the minimum investment, hedge
funds have been blamed for many of the recent traumatic events in world
financial markets, including the collapse of Europe's plan for stable currency
rates and the recent slide in the stock and bond markets.").
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withdraw money only on specified dates, and those dates rarely
occur more frequently than monthly. In some hedge funds,
investors can only withdraw their money once a year.32 Private
equity investors are not generally permitted to redeem their
interests until the termination of the fund, often more than ten
years after their original investment.
Private investment funds are not regulated and therefore can
borrow more and pay their investment managers more than
regulated investment funds such as mutual funds." Because they
are unregulated, there is limited publicly available information
about the structures and strategies of investment funds. Investors
often sign nondisclosure agreements with respect to the investment
funds in which they invest.
The investment fund manager generally invests in the fund as
the general partner. The investment fund manager may, but is not
required to, contribute a nominal amount of money to the fund in
exchange for this general-partner interest.37  Other investors
contribute money to the fund in exchange for limited-partner
interests. The investment fund manager invests the fund's money
(including borrowed money), generally in some combination of public
and private securities, commodities, and financial instruments, in
order to provide a return on investors' money.
It is important that investment funds be treated as
partnerships for tax purposes. The tax law treats a partnership as a
pass-through entity. This means that partners are taxed on their
proportionate share of the partnership's income, whether or not such
income is actually distributed to them. The income has the same
character to the partners as it did in the partnership's hands. 9
Investment funds keep track of the amount of money investors
have in the fund through "capital accounts." A capital account is
essentially a record of each investor's interest in the investment
fund. An investor's capital account is increased by, among other
things, the amount of money the investor contributes to the fund
and by the investor's proportionate share of the investment fund's
gain or income. The investor's capital account is decreased by,
among other things, the investor's proportionate share of fund losses
and by any amounts withdrawn by or otherwise distributed to the
32. Ordower, supra note 9, at 328.
33. Thomas J. Brennan & Karl S. Okamoto, Measuring the Tax Subsidy in
Private Equity and Hedge Fund Compensation, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 27, 40 (2008).
34. Ordower, supra note 9, at 324.
35. Id. at 325.
36. Melone, supra note 20, at 428.
37. DOUGLAS L. HAMMER ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF HEDGE FUNDS 92
(2005).
38. Melone, supra note 20, at 425.
39. I.R.C. § 702 (2006).
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investor. Investment funds do not generally make spontaneous
distributions to their investors, even when they sell assets. Instead,
they "allocate" gains and losses by increasing or decreasing the
value of the investors' capital accounts and reinvest gains in new
investments. The only way an investor can get money from the
investment fund is by withdrawing money from her capital account.
This Article will periodically use variations on the following
hypothetical investment fund in order to clarify or explain a concept:
Abby, an investment fund manager, forms a new hedge fund. She
takes a general-partner interest in the hedge fund but does not
invest any of her own money. Instead, she markets the hedge fund
to Ben and Christy, who each invest $50. Initially, Abby's capital
account is worth $0, and Ben and Christy each have a capital
account of $50. Abby uses the $100 to purchase one share of IBM
stock. One year and one day after purchasing the stock, it is worth
$110, and Abby causes the partnership to sell the IBM stock and
purchase two shares of Microsoft for $110. No money is distributed
to Ben or Christy, but both will be taxed on $5 of long-term capital
gains.
By investing in an investment fund, investors are able to pool
their funds with other investors, which allows them a simpler way
to diversify their portfolios.41 In addition, investors are able to take
advantage of the investment expertise of the investment fund
manager. However, by investing through a tax partnership,
investors are able to avoid an additional level of tax that would be
imposed if they invested in an entity taxed as a corporation.
B. How Investment Fund Managers Are Compensated
Engaging the investment fund manager's investment expertise
is not free-the investment fund manager is compensated for her
work. Her compensation generally consists of two components.
First, the investment fund manager receives a management fee,
40. See, e.g., Simon Friedman, Partnership Capital Accounts and Their
Discontents, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 791, 793-94 (2006). An investment fund
"allocates" gains and income to the partners, not necessarily by transferring
money or property to the partners, but instead by recording that a partner's
capital account has increased by the partner's proportionate share of the fund's
gain. In order to monetize her portion of the fund's gain, a partner would have
to withdraw a portion of her capital, subject to the limitations discussed above.
See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
41. Melone, supra note 20, at 428 ("Various factors have contributed to the
growth of such funds.. .. Developments in modern portfolio theory have
emphasized the benefits of diversification . . . .").
42. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 20 ("The growing adoption of portable alpha
strategies among institutional investors helps explain the increased demand for
the services of private investment fund managers.").
43. See I.R.C. § 11 (2006).
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which is a percentage (often 2%) of the value of the fund's assets."
The management fee is taxed to the investment fund manager as
ordinary income, and this treatment is uncontroversial. 5
In addition to the management fee, the investment fund
manager will receive an allocation of carried interest. The carried
interest is a "profits interest" in the investment fund that entitles
the investment fund manager to a percentage of the investment
fund's profits, even if the investment fund manager has not invested
any of her own money in the fund. 46 A profits interest is a type of
partnership interest that provides certain rights in the investment
fund but that has no current liquidation value,4 7 meaning that if the
investment fund were liquidated immediately, the holder of the
profits interest would not receive any money. By way of contrast,
the investors in an investment fund own a capital interest in the
fund, which has rights in the partnership and has current
liquidation value.48 Although the amount of the carried interest can
vary depending on the investment fund, it is often 20% of the
profits.49
Hedge funds generally allocate carried interest based on both
realized and unrealized growth in the market value of the fund's
assets."o That is, the investment fund manager earns carried
interest on all of the appreciation of the hedge fund's assets,
whether or not the fund has sold an asset and realized the gain on
the asset. Returning to Abby's hedge fund, assume that Abby
receives a standard 20% carried interest in the fund. At the end of
the year, the value of the fund's IBM stock has increased from $100
to $110. Even though the fund has not sold the IBM stock, on the
fund's books, Ben and Christy are each allocated $4 of gain (so their
capital accounts are each worth $54), and Abby is allocated $2 (so
she has a capital account of $2).
Investment funds use carried interest as a tool to align the
investment fund manager's interests with the interests of the
investors." Because the investment fund manager will share in all
of the fund's appreciation without a cap, it is in the investment fund
manager's economic interest to provide the best possible return on
44. Ordower, supra note 9, at 346.
45. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 9-10 ("The management fee is treated as
ordinary income to the GP, included in income as it is received on an annual or
quarterly basis.").
46. See id. at 3.
47. Id. at 11.
48. See id.
49. Ordower, supra note 9, at 346.
50. See id. at 347.
51. Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How Incentive
Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 ALA. L. REV.
41, 71-72 (2008).
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the investors' money.52
II. TAXATION OF CARRIED INTEREST
A. The Current Taxation of Carried Interest
The current taxation of carried interest is advantageous to
investment fund managers in two ways: the character of income
realized and the timing of taxation.
1. Character of Income
Carried interest is paid with respect to an investment fund
manager's profits interest in the fund. Because she is the general
partner of the investment fund, the investment fund manager pays
tax on her carried interest in the same manner as other investors.
Because of the partnership tax rules, the investment fund manager
can, like other investors in the fund, essentially treat the fund as if
it did not exist. Instead, she is taxed as if she owned 20% of the
investment fund's assets directly. As such, the investment fund
manager receives the benefit of the characterization of the income in
the fund's hands. If, during a year, half of the investment fund's
income is from short-term capital gains and half is from long-term
capital gains, half of the carried interest will be taxed to the
investment fund manager as short-term capital gains and half as
long-term capital gains. If the fund were to realize only long-term
capital gains, all of the carried interest allocated to the investment
fund manager would be long-term capital gains, taxable at a 15%
rate.
52. See id. Note, however, that the alignment of interests may not be
perfect: in a declining market, it is possible that the incentive allocation
structure could cause an investment fund manager to expend her time and
effort seeking new investors rather than providing a profit for existing
investors. Ordower, supra note 9, at 348. The investment fund manager
generally only receives an incentive allocation to the extent that the fund has
profits in excess of a high-water mark. If, for example, Ben had invested $50 in
Abby's fund and, in year one, his capital account was worth $55, Abby would
receive 20% of his $5 profit. If, in year two, Ben's capital account were to lose
$10, Abby would not receive any carried interest for that year (although she
would not be required to return the $1 she was allocated in year one as carried
interest). Moreover, she would not receive any carried interest from Ben until
after his capital account had earned back the $10. If, on the other hand, Dave
were to come in on the first day of year three and invest $45, Abby would earn
an incentive allocation on the first dollar of Dave's profits. See id. If the fund
were to earn enough to allocate $9 each to Ben and Dave in year three, Abby
would not get any incentive allocation from Ben but would be allocated $1.80
from Dave's gain. Because of this disconnect, if a hedge fund has lost too much,
it is more valuable for the investment fund manager to spend time marketing
the fund to new investors than to try to make up the loss for old investors.
53. See Fleischer, supra note 11, at 14-15.
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2. Timing of Taxation
The public debate about the taxation of carried interest has
focused principally on the fact that it can be taxed at a capital rate.
At least as valuable to investment fund managers as the character
of the carried interest, but less well understood, is when the
investment fund manager is taxed on the carried interest. Because
tax is generally imposed when gain is realized (typically when an
appreciated asset is sold), the investment fund manager is not taxed
on her carried interest when it is allocated to her. Instead, she
defers the tax until the investment fund sells the appreciated
assets.
Appreciation in the fund's assets will be allocated to the
investment fund manager whether or not the assets are sold,
increasing her capital account. Because of the allocation of
appreciation, the investment fund manager has economic income
whether or not the assets are sold. If the fund holds the appreciated
assets rather than selling them, the investment fund manager has
economic income without being required to pay any tax.56 And the
income is not just theoretical-the investment fund manager
generally has the right to withdraw money from her capital
account.57 In any event, the investment fund manager's increased
capital account represents a real accession to wealth even though
there is no tax imposed until a realization event occurs."
We return again to Abby's hedge fund. As before, the fund's
investment in IBM has appreciated from $100 to $110. Abby has
been allocated $2 of gains and Ben and Christy have each been
allocated $4 of gains. However, because the fund has not sold its
IBM stock, no realization event has occurred for tax purposes, and
Abby, Ben, and Christy have no tax liability.
54. See infra Part II.B (describing proposed I.R.C. § 710, which would
modify the character, but not the timing, of taxation of carried interest).
55. See Fleischer, supra note 11, at 11.
56. See Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Investors on a Mark-to-Market Basis,
43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 28), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1426402. For more discussion, see infra Part V.B.
57. See Ordower, supra note 9, at 358. Hedge funds traditionally invest
largely in liquid assets, meaning that if the investment fund manager were to
withdraw money from her capital account, the fund could sell assets in order to
have cash to distribute. See Kate Litvak, Governance Through Exit: Default
Penalties and Walkaway Options in Venture Capital Partnership Agreements,
40 WILA1IE L. REV. 771, 777 (2004).
58. Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral,
88 MICH. L. REV. 722, 724 n.4 (1990) ("An unrealized gain occurs when a
taxpayer retains property that has appreciated in value. The Code taxes this
appreciation only when the taxpayer enters into a realization event by
disposing of the property.").
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3. When Carried Interest Is Not Taxed
In order to understand how radically the current rules defer
tax, it is instructive to look at when tax could be imposed on the
carried interest. Theoretically, the most appropriate time to tax the
investment fund manager is in the year she receives the profits
interest pursuant to which she will be paid carried interest. It is
settled law that a partner who receives a capital interest in a
partnership in return for performing services is taxable on the
receipt of the interest." Although it is less clear whether the receipt
of a profits interest is a taxable event, it would make sense to tax a
partner who receives a profits interest in exchange for services when
the profits interest is received. The tax code does not state whether
the receipt of a profits interest is taxable, and the courts have come
to different conclusions. In Campbell v. Commissioner,6 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated in dicta that it doubted that a
taxpayer could be taxed upon receipt of a profits interest in
exchange for services performed by the taxpayer. On the other
hand, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had previously held that
such a receipt of a profits interest in exchange for services was
taxable.62 Courts, whether or not they find the receipt of a profits
interest to be a taxable event, have generally recognized that there
may be a practical problem in valuing the profits interests
received.
In response to the uncertainty over whether or not the receipt of
a profits interest was taxable, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
issued Revenue Procedure 93-27. 4 The IRS did not attempt to
resolve the question of the taxability of the receipt of a profits
interest. Instead, it stated that it would not treat the receipt of such
an interest as a taxable event, either for the partner or for the
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (as amended in 1996) ("The value of an
interest in such partnership capital so transferred to a partner as compensation
for services constitutes income to the partner under section 61.").
60. 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 823 ("Thus, we doubt that the tax court correctly held that
Campbell's profits interests were taxable upon receipt.").
62. Diamond v. Comm'r, 492 F.2d 286, 291 (7th Cir. 1974) ("But in the
absence of regulation, we think it sound policy to defer to the expertise of the
Commissioner and the Judges of the Tax Court, and to sustain their decision
that the receipt of a profit-share with determinable market value is income.").
63. See, e.g., Campbell, 943 F.2d at 823 ("More troubling, however, is
Campbell's argument that the profits interests he received had only speculative,
if any, value. We fully agree with this contention and we reverse the tax
court."); Diamond, 492 F.2d at 291 ("Do the disadvantages of treating the
creation of the profit-share as income in those instances where it has a
determinable market value at that time outweigh the desirability of imposing a
tax at the time the taxpayer has received an interest with determinable market
value as compensation for services?").
64. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
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partnership, unless the profits interest could be easily valued."
Carried interest is not easy to value, so because of the safe harbor
provided by the IRS, investment fund managers have not had to
worry about whether they owe taxes when they receive carried
interest.
Because the right to receive carried interest in the future is a
property right received in exchange for investment management
services, it would make theoretical sense to tax an investment fund
manager up front on the receipt of the profits interest. 66 However,
the IRS's safe harbor protects investment managers from tax upon
receipt, and there has been no serious attention paid to proposals to
impose tax at such a time. Moreover, it is impractical to impose
tax on the receipt of a profits interest. The value of a profits interest
would be the present value of all of the future carried interest to be
received by the investment fund manager. Although calculating
that value is theoretically possible, practically, it is virtually
impossible to assign a value to a profits interest upon receipt.68
Therefore the safe harbor of Revenue Procedure 93-27 will-and
should-continue to stand. Still, not taxing carried interest until
appreciated assets are sold results in a significant deferral of tax.
B. Reforms That Have Been Proposed in Congress: Section 710
In 2007, while attempting to find revenue to offset the cost of
patching the alternative minimum tax, Congress noticed the tax-
advantaged treatment of carried interest.7 0 Raising the rate of tax
on carried interest seemed like an ideal way to pay for the
65. Id. at 344.
66. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 10 ("When a GP receives a profits interest
in a partnership upon the formation of a fund, that receipt is not treated as a
taxable event. This treatment seems counterintuitive. The GP receives
something of value at the moment the partnership agreement is signed.").
67. Weisbach, supra note 20, at 733 ("The overwhelming consensus is that
taxing profits interests on receipt is not desirable, and such proposals have
received little attention in the current round of discussions.").
68. Id. at 733-34.
69. The alternative minimum tax, originally passed in order to make sure
that the wealthiest Americans could not entirely escape paying taxes, was not
indexed to inflation when originally passed. Therefore, every year, it reached
more taxpayers. Its exemption levels are set at an amount that easily reaches
middle-class taxpayers, which is politically untenable. But the revenue raised
is attractive, and the tax cost of repealing the alternative minimum tax entirely
is sufficiently high that there have been no successful attempts to actually
repeal it. Instead, Congress passes annual one-year "patches" raising the
exemption level for that year. See, e.g., Wesley Elmore, Grassley Proposes AMT
Safe Harbor for Estimated Tax Payments, 116 TAx NOTES 11, 13 (2007).
70. Meg Shreve & Dustin Stamper, Ways and Means Approves AMT Patch,
Extenders Package, 117 TAX NOTES 551, 551 (2007) ("The House Ways and
Means Committee last week approved in a 22-13 party-line vote a one-year
alternative minimum tax patch and 'extenders' package mainly offset by
deferred compensation and carried interest provisions.").
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alternative-minimum-tax patch: not only were investment fund
managers some of the highest-paid people in America,' but
Congress could capitalize on the apparent unfairness of wealthy
investment fund managers paying taxes at almost half the rate of
ordinary wage earners. 72 Moreover, the projected revenue from
taxing carried interest at ordinary rates was significant: the Joint
Committee on Taxation estimated that taxing carried interest at
ordinary levels would increase tax revenue by $14.689 billion over
73the first five years and $25.624 billion over ten years.
Since 2007, several members of Congress have introduced
legislation that would change the taxation of carried interest,
adding a new section 710 to the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.").74
71. In 2006, James Simons, one of the leading investment fund managers,
earned $1.7 billion. By way of comparison, Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs,
the highest-paid Wall Street executive in 2006, earned $54.3 million in salary,
cash, restricted stock, and stock options. Anderson & Creswell, supra note 12.
72. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2006). For a more in-depth discussion of the historic
taxation of carried interest, see supra Part II.A. While in the real world, any
given allocation by an investment fund would most likely consist of a mixture of
long-term capital gains, short-term capital gains, and ordinary income, in the
interest of simplicity, this Article will treat all allocations as consisting of
purely long-term capital gains.
73. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS
OF THE CHAIRMAN's AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 3996,
THE "TEMPORARY TAx RELIEF ACT OF 2007," SCHEDULED FOR MARKUP BY THE
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON NOVEMBER 1, 2007, JCX-105-07 (2007),
available at http://www.jct.gov/x-105-07.pdf. The Joint Committee's revenue
estimates are total dollars raised, not the present value of the revenue. It is
worth noting that, in the aftermath of the current recession, it has become clear
that taxing investment fund managers at ordinary rates is not a cure-all for
U.S. budgetary woes-although many investment fund managers are still
earning breathtaking amounts of income, many more private investment funds
are collapsing. See, e.g., Peter Lattman, Bill Aims for Disclosure by Private
Equity: Senate Legislation Would Require Firms to Register with SEC, Release
Details on Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2009, at C3 ("Ironically, the industry's
increased scrutiny comes at a time when private-equity profits have evaporated.
After a credit-boom buying binge in which private-equity-owned companies
issued more than $1 trillion in debt to fund leveraged buyouts, today many of
those companies are choking on all that debt."); Story, supra note 5 (stating that
in spite of the rough economy, in 2008, James Simons earned $2.5 billion for the
year). The Joint Committee on Taxation's most recent estimates of the revenue
from taxing carried interest as ordinary income is down sharply to $10.456
billion over the first five years (a decline of 29%), while the ten-year estimate is
$23.064 billion (a decline of 10%). JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG.,
ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROvISIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL AS DESCRIBED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MAY 2009, JCX-28-09 (2009), available at
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3558. Carried
interest no longer represents the revenue panacea that it appeared to be in
2007, and there is no guarantee that it will represent material tax revenue in
the future.
74. See H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 1201 (2007) (containing proposed I.R.C.
§ 710).
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On December 9, 2009, the House of Representatives passed the Tax
Extenders Act of 2009." In order to prevent the bill from increasing
the federal deficit, the House of Representatives offset its cost by
including a number of revenue-raising provisions, among them
section 710.76 The principal effect of section 710 on investment fund
managers would be to recharacterize carried interest as ordinary
income rather than capital gains. 7 In addition, if an investment
fund manager were to sell her profits interest, she would be taxed at
ordinary rates rather than capital gains rates on any gain from the
sale. Section 710 would provide investment fund managers with a
small escape from taxation at ordinary rates, though: an investment
fund manager could be taxed at capital gains rates on a portion of
her interest in the fund to the extent that she owned the interest as
a result of investing her own capital and provided that the
investment fund reasonably allocated its gains and losses between
that portion of the investment fund manager's interest resulting
from actual capital contribution and that portion resulting from the
carried interest.
Section 710 has been criticized both by those who see no need
for change in the current taxation of carried interest and by those
advocating reform. Professor Howard E. Abrams, who supports the
status quo, argues that section 710 overreaches, treating as ordinary
income some amount of income that represents a risk premium.so
Professor Matthew A. Melone argues that it causes capital gains
income to disappear and that it creates double taxation."1
Professors Nodl B. Cunningham and Mitchell L. Engler, who
support reform, have three objections to section 710's
recharacterization rule. First, they agree with Professor Abrams
that treating the entire carried interest as ordinary income goes too
75. H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. (2009).
76. Press Release, Representative Sander Levin, House Passes Tax Relief
Extensions (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/mil2_levin
/PR120909.shtml ("The legislation does not add to the deficit and offsets the tax
relief by putting a stop to billions of dollars worth of tax abuse through overseas
tax havens and ending the special preferential tax treatment for carried
interest given to fund managers as compensation.").
77. See H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. § 602 (2009) (containing proposed I.R.C.
§ 710(a)(1)). For a more detailed explanation and analysis of the terms of
section 710, see Howard E. Abrams, A Close Look at the Carried Interest
Legislation, 117 TAX NOTES 961 (2007).
78. See H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. § 602 (2009) (containing proposed I.R.C.
§ 710(b)).
79. See id. (containing I.R.C. § 710(c)(2)).
80. Abrams, supra note 77, at 971 ("There is no perfect way to distinguish
the third, entrepreneurial component from the two compensation
components .. . ."); Abrams, supra note 20, at 225 ("But proposed Section 710
makes no allowance for adjusting the definition of a 'reasonable' allocation on
capital for distributions even if this distribution increases Ys claim on all
future distributions.").
81. Melone, supra note 20, at 479.
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far.82 Next they argue that funds could avoid the results of section
710 by restructuring the carried interest as a loan from the
partners. Finally they argue that section 710 will produce a lock-
in effect, distorting the investment fund manager's incentives to
make the best investment decisions on behalf of the fund.Y
III. POLICY BASES FOR TAXING CAPITAL GAINS AT PREFERENTIAL
RATES
Whether capital gains should be taxed at preferential rates is,
itself, a controversial question," and it has been a controversial
question nearly since the inception of the income tax." Although it
is beyond the scope of this Article to join the debate on whether
capital gains should be subject to a preferential tax rate in
comparison with ordinary income, it is necessary to review the
justifications for such a preferential rate in order to know the
criteria to apply to carried interest. Scholars generally agree that
preferential rates on capital gains are not optimal, adding
unnecessary complexity and gamesmanship to the tax code," and
should be avoided unless necessary to resolve distortions in taxpayer
incentives.8 Unless taxing carried interest at a preferential rate is
necessary in order to solve a similar distortion inherent in carried
interest, then the tax system should minimize complexity and
distortions associated with preferential rates and tax carried
interest at ordinary rates." These distortions arise, in general,
82. Cunningham & Engler, supra note 19, at 133 ("[Section 710] goes too
far by treating the entire carried interest return as ordinary income, rather
than limiting the compensation inclusion to an interest rate return.").
83. Id. at 135-36.
84. Id. at 136-37.
85. See, e.g., No6l B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a
Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAx L. REV. 319, 320 (1993) ("We found all
arguments favoring the [capital gains] preference wanting."); Halperin, supra
note 24, at 381 ("I would reject a capital gains preference as a tolerable
solution ... at all."); Daniel N. Shaviro, Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX
L. REV. 393, 394 (1993) ("My own view is that, as the maximum statutory rate
for tax on ordinary income increases, at some point the argument for the
preference becomes irresistible, despite the danger that Congress will set the
preferential capital gains rate well below the point of revenue maximization.").
86. Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35
TAxEs 247, 247 (1957) ("The issue is almost as old as the income tax itself.").
87. Id. at 262 ("Preferential treatment for capital gains is the main source
of complexity in our income tax.").
88. See Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 85, at 321 ("Although
complexity attributable to the preference is a significant offsetting factor, the
preference might be efficient if it resulted in taxation of capital income at the
revenue-maximizing rate.").
89. See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 24, at 382 ("Since a capital gains
differential can affect choices between one investment and another, such a route
is justifiable only if one thinks that the tax system improperly discriminates
against some types of investments, or that affirmative encouragement of
94 (Vol. 45
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because tax is imposed when gains are realized rather than when
they arise.'
Professors Noil B. Cunningham and Deborah H. Schenk have
broken down the arguments for taxing capital gains at a preferential
rate into seven categories: (1) capital gains are not income,
(2) consumption, and not income, should be taxed, (3) bunching,
(4) double taxation of corporate earnings, (5) inflation, (6) risk, and
(7) the lock-in effect.91 Each of these arguments purports that it is
necessary to tax capital gains at a lower rate than that to which
ordinary income is subject in order to rectify the imperfect
treatment of capital gains under current law.92  Professors
Cunningham and Schenk reject each of these arguments in favor of
a capital gains preference as the best solution to the distortions
caused by realization accounting.93 Moreover, they reject a capital
gains preference as even a second-best solution to all the problems it
purports to solve except for the lock-in effect.94
In response to the argument that capital gains are not income,
they reply that this argument relies on an unsophisticated
understanding of what constitutes income and ignores the Haig-
Simons definition of income broadly used today. There is no reason
why capital gains income is inherently different from other income.95
The argument that consumption, rather than income, should be
taxed (with its corollary that capital gains are not consumption and
therefore should not be taxed) is beside the point. Congress has
chosen to impose an income tax and, in an income tax, the fact that
capital gains are not consumption does not argue for a preferential
rate on the taxation of capital gains.
The bunching argument is that realization causes income that
has accrued over a number of years to be taxed in a single year.
That is, if Ben were to purchase his interest in the fund for $50 and
sell it two years later for $100, he would be taxed on $50 of gain in
the second year. Some portion of his gain, however, is attributable
to the first year he held the fund. This is only a problem for Ben,
particular types of investment is desirable.").
90. Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 85, at 322 ("There are at least four
major ways in which the current treatment of capital gains diverges from this
ideal-all attributable to the realization requirement.").
91. Id. at 319. For a more detailed summary of arguments in favor of a
preferential capital gains rate, see Blum, supra note 86, at 248-61.
92. Id. at 322.
93. Id. at 320.
94. Id. at 320-21.
95. Id. at 326. Under Haig-Simons, "personal income" is defined as the
sum of consumption plus the change in value of assets. Brunson, supra note 56
(manuscript at 6 n.11). The Haig-Simons definition of income has become the
generally accepted definition of income, acting as a basis for most income-tax
theory. Id.
96. Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 85, at 326-27.
97. Id. at 328.
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however, if he is in a higher tax bracket in the second year than he
was in the first and is, therefore, taxed on the first year's
appreciation at a higher rate than he would have been if he had paid
taxes on that appreciation in the first year." Even if he is in a
higher tax bracket, however, the higher rate of tax is offset to some
degree by the benefits to Ben of deferring the payment of the tax.99
Proponents of a preferential rate on capital gains argue that it
reduces the impact of inefficiencies created by the double taxation of
corporate income.'00 Corporate income is subject to at least two
levels of tax: first, when earned by the corporation and second, when
paid as a dividend to shareholders, causing distortions in
corporations' investment choices.' 0' While Professors Cunningham
and Schenk argue that there is little or no distortion caused by
corporations' retained earnings (which are essentially the capital
gains realized by a shareholder upon her sale of the stock),'02 other
commentators argue that distortions caused by double taxation of
corporations are, in fact, a significant justification for preferential
rates.' Whether or not the double-taxation argument is a good
argument for preferential capital gains rates, however, is essentially
irrelevant to the question of whether carried interest should be
taxed at capital gains rates. If valid, the double-taxation argument
supports preferential rates for corporate stock but does nothing to
support capital gains treatment derived from a partnership
interest. 104
Inflation is primarily a problem with short-term gains; as an
asset is held longer, inflation generally represents a smaller and
smaller portion of the gain on an asset.'05 The way capital gains are
currently taxed, however, short-term gains (i.e., gains on capital
assets held for one year or less) are taxable at ordinary rates, while
long-term gains (i.e., gains on capital assets held for more than one
year) are taxed at preferential rates.106
98. Id. ("Bunching is a potential problem only in a system with graduated
tax rates and only if the taxpayer is in a higher bracket on the disposition date
than she was when the income accrued.").
99. Id.
100. Id. at 331.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 332.
103. Shaviro, supra note 85, at 395 ("I regard the double taxation of
corporate income as a far more serious problem than [Professors Cunningham
and Shenk] do.").
104. Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 85, at 336 ("This integration
rationale supports a preference only for stock in C corporations and no other
assets.").
105. Id. at 338.
106. Only a "net capital gain" is taxed at the preferential 15% rate. I.R.C.
§ 1(h)(1)(C) (2006). "Net capital gain" is defined as the excess of a taxpayer's
net long-term capital gain for a taxable year over the taxpayer's net short-term
capital loss. I.R.C. § 1222(11) (2006). President Obama's fiscal year 2010
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Broadly speaking, then, there are two justifications that would
support taxing carried interest at a preferential long-term capital
gains rate. First, the lower rate of tax increases the rate of return
on entrepreneurial risk, thus encouraging risk taking.'0 7  Second,
the reduced rate of tax diminishes the so-called lock-in effect of the
realization method of accounting.' 8
Although the lock-in argument provides nominal support for
taxing carried interest at capital gains rates, the simplified mark-to-
market proposal laid out in this Article deals with lock-in in a way
that neutralizes it as a problem, and the risk arguments are
effectively rendered moot by non-tax incentives and are inapplicable
to a profits interest.
A. The Lock-in Effect
Because appreciation on capital assets is only taxed upon a
realization event, such as the sale of the asset, and because gains
are not taxed at death, investors are reluctant to sell appreciated
assets and incur a tax that can be deferred or eliminated entirely by
continuing to hold the asset."' Commentators generally agree that
a preferential rate on capital gains ameliorates the lock-in
problem."'
With investment funds, the lock-in problem can potentially be
even more acute. The investment fund manager's capital account is
increased both by realized and unrealized gain; under both the
current treatment of carried interests and under proposed section
710, however, the investment fund manager only pays tax when the
investment fund sells the appreciated asset or otherwise realizes the
appreciation. Moreover, to the extent that the investment fund
manager can withdraw money from her capital account, she does not
need to sell the asset in order to monetize the unrealized
revenue proposals appear to propose ending the preferential rates on capital
assets held for longer than five years, which, if enacted, would suggest that the
government is at least considering inflationary concerns in its design of the
preferential rates. See DEP'T OF THE TREAS., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALs 77 (2009), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/grnbk09.pdf ("The reduced rates
on gains on assets held over 5 years would be repealed.").
107. While Professors Cunningham and Schenk acknowledge that the risk
issue potentially presents a legitimate distortion, they argue that a preferential
capital gains rate is a poor second-best solution to a problem that could better
be solved by eliminating limitations on the deduction of losses. Cunningham &
Schenk, supra note 85, at 343. Nonetheless, because such limitations on
deduction do exist, this Article will treat risk as a potentially legitimate
argument in favor of preferential rates and will evaluate whether the risk
argument supports a preferential rate for carried interest.
108. Abrams, supra note 20, at 219-20.
109. Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 85, at 344.
110. Id. at 350.
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appreciation.1" If she were subject to a 35% rate of tax on
realization, she would have a strong incentive to hold onto an
appreciated asset, even if it would be in the other investors' best
interest for the fund to sell the asset and invest the proceeds from
that sale in something else.
Preferential rates are, however, a second-best solution to the
lock-in problem. Even at a 15% tax rate, the investment fund
manager has an incentive to cause the fund to hold appreciated
assets rather than to sell them. If, instead, appreciation were taxed
to the investment fund manager, who makes the decision of when to
sell assets, on a mark-to-market basis, the distortions creating the
lock-in effect would be eliminated." 2  Under a mark-to-market
system, the investment fund manager would be taxed on any gain in
her capital account, whether or not the appreciated assets had been
sold. While implementation of a mark-to-market system on
investments in general is unlikely,13 marking the investment fund
manager's carried interest to market would eliminate the lock-in
effect. Because the investment fund manager would be taxed on her
carried interest annually, she would be indifferent, from a tax
perspective, as to whether to sell any appreciated assets."'
B. Encouraging Investment in Risky Assets
The other argument for taxing carried interest at preferential
rates is that such a preference encourages risk taking by the
investment fund manager.1"1 In a purely proportional tax world,
where investors are taxed on their gains and are able to deduct their
losses fully, the tax rate would not materially affect an investor's
risk tolerance."' However, the current U.S. tax system in some
cases limits the deductibility of losses. 17 Suppose that Abby's hedge
fund invests $100 in IBM stock. Abby expects that in one year the
stock will either be worth $150 or $50. If she were taxed at a 35%
111. See supra Part II.A.2.
112. Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 85, at 346; see also Abrams, supra
note 20, at 220 ("[Ihf the realization doctrine were eliminated either directly or
indirectly, [the lock-in effect] would disappear.").
113. See Brunson, supra note 56 (manuscript at 3) ("In spite of the
theoretical superiority of mark-to-market accounting, however, it is unlikely to
supplant realization accounting."); Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 85, at
346 ("The consensus, however, is that the cost of implementing an accrual
system would be so high as to make it infeasible.").
114. An approximate marking of the carried interest to market is central to
this Article's proposal. For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part V.
115. Abrams, supra note 20, at 219.
116. In fact, Professors Cunningham and Schenk argue that, in such a
world, an investor's appetite for risk may increase. Cunningham & Schenk,
supra note 85, at 341. Where losses are fully deductible, although an investor's
potential upside is reduced, her potential loss is reduced by the same amount-
the amount of the tax. Id.
117. Id. at 342.
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rate, a gain would be worth $32.50 after taxes." If losses were fully
deductible, she would only face an after-tax loss of $32.50.19 If,
however, her full gain will be taxed, but she can only deduct, for
example, 80% of her losses, the tax system has increased the
downside risk of an investment relative to the potential gain. She
still can only expect $32.50 of after-tax gains, but she faces $36 of
after-tax losses.120 Because the projected loss is greater than the
projected gain, the tax treatment of losses serves to discourage Abby
from making the risky investment. At a lower rate of tax, however,
this distortion in the amount of risk is diminished. 121
This justification for preferential capital gains rates is not
convincing in the carried interest area, however, for at least two
reasons. First, the investment fund manager has non-tax reasons to
make risky investments. In order to attract investors, and therefore
to increase the size of the investment fund (and the investment fund
manager's compensation), the investment fund needs to
demonstrate that it has strong returns. Riskier investments provide
for more potential upside than less risky investments.122
Moreover, the carried interest is a profits interest. If the
investment fund loses money in any given year, the investment fund
manager is not allocated any carried interest. But, because the
carried interest is a profits interest, she does not absorb 20% of the
fund's loss. With respect to her carried interest, the investment
fund manager is in the same position if the fund loses 10% or 50% of
its value.12 3 As such, the investment fund manager is indifferent to
whether the loss is or is not deductible. In fact, because the
investment fund manager has no risk of loss with respect to her
carried interest, she should be willing to make riskier investments,
in hopes of a larger payoff, than an individual investor investing for
herself would make.
Sometimes proponents of the status quo invoke a different
118. That is, she would have a gain of $50 and pay taxes of $17.50, leaving
her with $32.50.
119. That is because the $50 loss would give rise to a deduction of $17.50,
reducing the amount of tax she would otherwise have to pay.
120. If she can only deduct 80% of her losses, she can only deduct $40 of her
$50 loss. At a 35% marginal rate, that gives Abby a deduction of $14, rather
than the $17.50 she would have without the limitation.
121. At a 15% rate, Abby could expect to pay $7.50 in taxes on a gain,
leaving her with $42.50 after taxes, and would have a $6 deduction on a loss,
leaving her with an after-tax loss of $44. The diminution of loss is not
eliminated by using a lower rate of tax, but it is decreased.
122. JAE K. SlUM & JOEL G. SIEGEL, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 133 (3d ed.
2008) ("All financial decisions involve some sort of risk-return trade-off; the
greater the risk, the greater the return expected.").
123. Note, however, that, with respect to her capital account (that is, any of
her own money that she has invested and any carried interest that was
allocated to her in a previous year that she did not withdraw), the investment
fund manager is subject to losses.
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concept of entrepreneurial risk, standing alone and divorced from
any concept of the deductibility of losses, as the reason why carried
interest should be taxed at capital rates.'24  In essence, the
argument goes that profits interests are inherently risky-if the
fund does not make a profit, the investment fund manager is not
compensated. Therefore, the carried interest must be a return from
capital, not from labor.125 But the proponents of this theory of
entrepreneurial risk do not explain why, from a tax-policy
perspective, a risky return should be taxed at capital rates. In fact,
return from labor can be risky-people who are paid on commission
(including salespeople and real-estate brokers) are often paid only if
they close their sales. Moreover, other employees receive bonuses
tied to individual performance, market conditions, and other factors
at least partly out of their own control. Even though it is risky,
however, their compensation is unquestionably treated as ordinary
income for tax purposes. 126 Likewise, the fact that the amount, if
any, of carried interest to be allocated to the investment fund
manager in a given year is subject to risk is not, of itself, a sufficient
justification for preferential capital gains rates.
IV. ECONOMIC EQUIVALENTS OF CARRIED INTEREST
The principal argument commentators make in support of the
current tax treatment of carried interest revolves around what
carried interest most resembles economically. Defenders of the
status quo argue that analogizing the investment fund manager to a
service provider (who would be taxed at ordinary rates on service
income) is a poor match for the economic reality of the investment
fund manager's role.127  Instead, they argue, carried interest
represents legitimate return on capital, and it is irrelevant that the
investment fund manager is providing labor rather than capital.
The most accurate analogy for the investment fund manager is that
of an investor who should be treated on the same footing as the
limited partners."' Those who favor reform argue that carried
124. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Congress Weighs End
to Tax Break for Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 2007, at Al.
125. Melone, supra note 20, at 488 ("Critics of the current tax treatment of
carried interests do not call for a broad-based effort to identify the labor
component in the myriad situations in which it is embedded in capital income.
Nor do they assert that the particular duties performed by the service partners
in a fund disqualify the income as capital because the same duties are
performed by individual investors without a similar fuss being raised.").
126. Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity
Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1071, 1152 (2008).
127. See, e.g., Melone, supra note 20, at 487.
128. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 20, at 218 ("Those who say that the capital
gain/ordinary income distinction draws a sharp line between returns to capital
and returns to labor treat these exceptions as anomalies, but perhaps they are
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interest is more akin to compensation, and therefore should be taxed
at ordinary rates.129  Ultimately, this question of whether carried
interest is a return to capital or to labor is beside the point; as
demonstrated, carried interest is outside of the justifications for
preferential capital gains rates. However, because the debate has so
far focused on whether carried interest is a return to capital or to
labor, it is worth looking to see how well carried interest fits in the
paradigm of returns to capital."10
A. Defending the Status Quo
It is clear that an investor trading securities on her own behalf
will realize capital gains on the sale of her securities. 3' Supporters
of the status quo argue that the investment fund manager is, in
essence, doing just this: trading securities on her own behalf.132 The
investment fund manager is a partner in the investment fund and,
by virtue of the long history of partnership taxation, it is more
appropriate to tax her as such.'3 3 Because partnerships are used to
obtain tax treatment for partners as if they are individually
performing the activities of the partnership, the argument
continues, the investment fund manager should be treated as if she
not so anomalous if the line is drawn differently."); Melone, supra note 20, at
487-88 ("Moreover, a fundamental premise of partnership taxation is to tax the
partners in a fashion similar to that in which they would have been taxed had
they undertaken their activities in their individual capacities. It is beyond
dispute that had the investment income been earned directly by the service
partner, the income would have been capital in nature. . .. "); Weisbach, supra
note 20, at 749 ("[T]he right distinction is between a partner and someone who
works for the partnership but is not properly treated as engaged in partnership
business. Although this line is hard to draw, private equity sponsors would
clearly be treated as partners under both current law and reform proposals.").
129. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89, 105
(2008) ("The Code thus treats carried interest distributions-the bread and
butter of fund manager compensation-as a return on low-taxed investment
capital rather than as high-taxed labor income."). Professor Rosenzweig, on the
other hand, argues that this binary view of the tax character of carried
interest-as either ordinary income or long-term capital gains-is too narrow;
instead, he advocates looking for a third way, such as taxing carried interest as
short-term capital gains. Rosenzweig, supra note 28, at 741-42.
130. The point of this Part is not to demonstrate that carried interest is
better thought of as a return to capital, but rather that either classification is
problematic and that it is not unreasonable to analogize carried interest to a
return to labor.
131. See I.R.C. § 1221(a) (2006).
132. Melone, supra note 20, at 487-88 ("It is beyond dispute that had the
investment income been earned directly by the service partner, the income
would have been capital in nature, despite the fact that numerous labor
intensive activities are performed in generating such income.").
133. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 20, at 754 ("The long history of the
development of the partnership tax rules and the many policy proposals for
their reform indicate the strong preference for taxing partners as if they
engaged in partnership activity directly.").
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actually is trading on her own behalf. 1
But is the investment fund manager trading securities on her
own behalf? To the extent that the investment fund manager has
contributed money to the investment fund, yes. And horizontal-
equity concerns suggest that the investment fund manager's tax
treatment on returns generated by her contributed capital should be
treated the same as returns generated by other partners'
contributed capital.15  But the investment fund manager may
provide little to none of the fund's capital. 36 While the investment
fund manager's return from her invested capital should certainly be
treated as capital gains, there is no reason why the rest of the fund
should be treated as being traded on the investment fund manager's
own account. '3 7  As regards that much larger portion of the
investment fund, the investment fund manager is buying and selling
securities on behalf of others, and, if she were an investment
advisor, would be taxed on any income paid her by the other
investors at ordinary rates.
Moreover, there is no question that the investment fund
manager is a service provider. Payments for services provided to a
partnership by a partner are treated as payments made to a
nonpartner. '38 Nobody argues that the management fee should be
treated as an allocation to a partner in her capacity as such, and
that it should therefore be treated as capital gains. '" While carried
interest can be analogized to many things, including a return on a
nonrecourse loan 40 and a nonqualified stock option,141 in its simplest
form, investors pay carried interest to the investment fund manager
in order to align her economic interest with theirs. 142 As such, there
134. See Melone, supra note 20, at 488.
135. See infra Part V.C-D.
136. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
137. In a related vein, Professor Weisbach argues that, rather than funding
the investment fund by selling equity, the investment fund manager could
borrow the money and invest it; because the investment fund manager could
receive capital gains treatment on its leveraged investment, it would be wrong
to treat the manager of an equity-funded investment fund differently.
Weisbach, supra note 20, at 741-42. I find this argument unconvincing for the
same reasons I find unconvincing the argument that the investment fund
manager should be treated as borrowing money to make a 20% investment in
the fund. See infra Part IV.B.2.
138. I.R.C. § 707(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(a) (as amended in 1983).
139. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
140. See Fleischer, supra note 11, at 51.
141. Id. at 25.
142. A tale is told, perhaps apocryphally, about an investment bank that had
an internal hedge fund for the bank's employees. The fund charged a
management fee but, because it was for employees, there was no carried
interest. Once employees had invested in the hedge fund, though, the
investment fund manager sat on the assets without trading or otherwise
seeking any return. The investment bank loved the investment fund manager's
strategy, because the investment fund manager was earning the 2% fee for the
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is no overwhelming reason why carried interest cannot be
analogized to compensation income.'
B. Proposals for Reform
Commentators who believe that the current taxation of carried
interests at pass-through rates is inappropriate have proposed types
of reforms that, broadly, fall into two categories. Under the first,
the character of the taxable income would be changed. Under the
second, the grant of the profits interest would be treated as an
interest-free loan from the investors to the investment fund
manager allowing the investment fund manager to purchase a 20%
interest in the fund. Each proposal solves some of the problems
with the current taxation of carried interest, but each also presents
additional difficulties.
1. Recharacterization
Recharacterizing carried interest as ordinary income rather
than capital gains is the most intuitively appealing reform.
Essentially, this is the approach proposed section 710 takes.'4 4 It is
appealing largely because of its apparent simplicity-instead of
taking into account the character of the income underlying the
investment fund manager's carried interest, all carried interest
would be characterized as ordinary income.
Other than recharacterizing carried interest, section 710 would
not make any significant changes to the current taxation of carried
interest. Notably, the investment fund manager would continue to
defer any taxation of her carried interest until the underlying
bank every year. The employees, on the other hand, felt cheated because not
only was their money not growing, it was actually shrinking by virtue of the
annual management fee. Whether or not such a fund existed, the story
illustrates why investors would want the amount of the investment fund
manager's compensation to be linked to the fund's performance. (And why, in
this story, would the employees not just pull their money out? Most hedge
funds limit the frequency with which withdrawals can be made and, sometimes,
the amount that can be withdrawn on any withdrawal date.)
143. For example, the management fee could be treated as base salary and
the carried interest as a performance bonus. Professor Weisbach objects to the
use of analogical reasoning in determining the proper taxation of carried
interest because, he says, an analogy can be made equally well for treatment as
capital income or treatment as services income and because generally the
comparison criteria are deployed without explaining why they matter.
Weisbach, supra note 20, at 741. While I agree that analogies do not create a
prima facie case for treating carried interest as ordinary income or as capital
gains, they can be useful for thinking about the basket in which carried interest
belongs. Ultimately, carried interest, like any other investment income, is sui
generis, but it must be categorized somehow, and it is useful to see that it has
similarities to other types of income in the basket in which it is placed.
144. H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. § 602 (2009) (containing proposed I.R.C.
§ 710(a)(1)).
103
HeinOnline  -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 103 2010
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
appreciated assets were sold.
Although section 710 is simple, commentators have pointed out
a number of problems with this approach, including the availability
of planning options to avoid it 4' and the fact that it causes capital
gains income to disappear.14 6
What has not been discussed, but is perhaps more important, is
that section 710 aggravates the lock-in problem discussed above.'4 7
If the investment fund manager will be taxed at a 35% rate, but only
when the investment fund realizes the income, the investment fund
manager has an even stronger incentive to continue to hold any
appreciated assets rather than sell them, potentially to the
detriment of the other investors.148  Because its enactment would
increase the lock-in effect of investment funds, section 710 would
strengthen the policy justifications for taxing carried interest at
preferential capital gains rates.
2. Cost-of-Capital Approach
Professors Fleischer, Cunningham, and Engler have all
suggested variations on a second type of treatment of carried
interest, one they call a "cost-of-capital" (or "interest charge")
approach. 1 Simplified and summarized, their proposals would
continue to treat carried interest in the same manner as it is
currently treated. However, the cost-of-capital approach would
create a deemed loan from the investors to the investment fund
manager sufficient to allow the investment fund manager to
purchase a 20% interest in the investment fund. 5 0 The deemed loan
would be treated as an interest-free loan to the investment fund
manager. Presumably, if this loan were made in an arm's-length
transaction, the investors would have charged interest at the
market rate. Because there is no interest, the investors would be
deemed to forgive the interest, and the investment fund manager
would be taxed, at ordinary rates, on the interest deemed forgiven."'
As such, the investment fund manager would be treated as having
some amount of ordinary income every year, whether or not she was
allocated any carried interest, but her portion of the fund's gains
could continue to be treated as capital gains.
Although an elegant solution, Professor Melone has criticized it
145. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 51. But see id. at 57 ("But there is nothing
offensive about [restructuring to avoid the tax].").
146. Melone, supra note 20, at 479.
147. See supra Part III.A.
148. See supra Part III.A.
149. Cunningham & Engler, supra note 19, at 128; Fleischer, supra note 11,
at 6.
150. Cunningham & Engler, supra note 19, at 126; Fleischer, supra note 11,
at 40.
151. Cunningham & Engler, supra note 19, at 127; Fleischer, supra note 11,
at 40.
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on a number of grounds, including that it would not significantly
change the results of current law, that a loan on the terms imputed
to the carry would not be recognized as a loan under current tax
law, and that the transaction is not a loan and, therefore, should not
be treated as a loan.152
Not only is the carried interest not a loan, but there is no
evidence that, from a business perspective, the investors would be
willing to make such a loan to the investment fund manager. If the
investors were willing to do so-and the loan were respected for tax
purposes-there is no reason why investment fund managers could
not structure their funds to include a loan from the investors to the
manager. In fact, Professor Fleischer recommends that something
similar to section 710 be enacted as a baseline rule, which would
allow funds to structure the investment fund manager's
compensation as a loan rather than as carried interest if that is
their preferred tax treatment. 5 3
Ultimately, it is not clear that the economic similarities between
carried interest and an interest-free loan are compelling enough to
add the complexity that the cost-of-capital approach would introduce
into the tax system. Although such a loan would achieve the same
economics as carried interest, it is not a better description of the
business deal. The investors do not think of themselves as making a
loan to the investment fund manager, and the economic similarities
are not so compelling as to favor treatment as a loan over treatment
as a partnership allocation.
V. THE SIMPLIFIED MARK-TO-MARKET PROPOSAL
Any proposal to tax carried interest as ordinary income must
not only determine whether carried interest is more like services
income or investment income; it must also take into account
whether the policies underlying the capital gains preference would
apply to carried interest.
This Article proposes a simplified mark-to-market regime
imposed on carried interest. A mark-to-market system of taxation
departs radically from the current realization system: under mark-
to-market, a taxpayer pays tax every year on all appreciation in her
assets, without regard to whether those assets have been sold.
Under this Article's simplified mark-to-market proposal, an
investment fund manager would pay taxes annually on the amount
of carried interest allocated to her, irrespective of whether the fund
had sold assets, and would pay taxes on that amount at ordinary
rates. This simplified mark-to-market approach shares the basic
idea underlying section 710, that is, to tax carried interest at
ordinary rates, but differs in ways that accommodate the capital
152. Melone, supra note 20, at 472-73.
153. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 57.
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gains analysis.
A. Taxing Carried Interest Under a Simplified Mark-to-Market
Regime
Under the simplified mark-to-market approach, an investment
fund manager would be taxable every year on the amount of carried
interest allocated to her, without regard to whether the fund had
sold the appreciated assets and realized the gain. She would pay
tax on the carried interest at ordinary rates. Upon paying taxes, the
investment fund manager would be deemed to have contributed the
amount of the carried interest to the investment fund, and her
capital account would increase by the amount of the carried
interest. 15 Any gain or loss realized as a return on the investment
154. The deemed contribution does not represent a change from current law.
Under current law, undistributed profits earned pursuant to a profits interest
in a partnership (including carried interest in an investment fund) transform
the next year into a capital interest in the partnership. Postlewaite, supra note
8, at 845.
It is necessary to note that the deemed contribution by the investment
fund manager would cause the investment fund's outside basis to differ from its
inside basis. Very simply, tax basis represents the amount of after-tax money
used to purchase an asset. In this case, the asset is both the fund itself and the
securities in which the fund has invested. Generally, an asset's basis is the cost
of the asset. I.R.C. § 1012 (2006). Basis is used to calculate taxable gain or loss
on the sale or exchange of an asset. Id. § 1001(a). "Outside basis" is the sum of
each partner's tax basis in the fund, whereas "inside basis" is the fund's tax
basis in its assets. Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth
Under the Income Tax, 81 IND. L.J. 539, 553 n.73 (2006) ("Outside basis is the
equity holder's basis in her tax partnership interest; inside basis is the
predistribution basis of an asset, the ownership of which is held by the tax
partnership."). If Ben and Christy each contributed $50 to Abby's hedge fund,
there is a total outside basis of $100 in the hedge fund. The fund purchases
assets for $100, so the fund also has an inside basis of $100. During its first
year of operation, the hedge fund earns $10, $2 of which is allocable to Abby.
Under the simplified mark-to-market approach, Abby would be taxed on the $2
and would receive $2 of basis in the fund. Because it has not sold any assets,
the fund would continue to have an inside basis of $100. However, there would
be an outside basis of $102 (both Ben and Christy would have a basis of $50 in
the fund, and Abby would have a basis of $2).
During the life of the fund, this disconnect should not make any difference
to the investors, who will be allocated gain according to their capital accounts.
On liquidation, any difference between inside and outside basis will resolve
itself: if investment assets are distributed, an investor will take the assets with
a basis equal to her outside basis in the fund. I.R.C. § 732(b) (2006). If Abby's
hedge fund were to liquidate after the first year and distribute its assets, Ben
and Christy would each receive assets worth $54 and would each have a basis of
$50 in those assets. The $4 difference between the value of the assets and their
basis would represent the untaxed appreciation. Abby, on the other hand,
would receive assets worth $2 and would have a basis in those assets of $2.
Because she was already taxed on the appreciation when she was allocated her
carried interest, the rule of section 732(b) prevents her from being taxed on that
appreciation a second time.
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fund manager's deemed contribution would take a pass-through
character, as capital gain or loss.
This approach is not strictly taxation on a mark-to-market
basis. Most notably, the simplified mark-to-market approach does
not require an investment fund to value its assets accurately and
objectively. Instead, an investment fund would be permitted to
continue to value its assets using whatever system it has used in the
past. Allowing investment funds to continue to determine the value
of their assets reduces the administrative costs that adopting a new
valuation calculation would impose. Such costs would ultimately be
borne by the funds' investors, reducing their returns. Because this
simplified mark-to-market taxation can tax investment fund
managers in a fair manner, there is no need to impose extra costs.
This simplified mark-to-market approach accomplishes a
number of objectives that commentators critical of the current
system of taxing carried interest seek. First, it treats the carried
interest as ordinary income, which is both the apparently fair result
as well as the result mandated by the capital gains analysis
performed above. The simplified mark-to-market approach also
eliminates certain distortions that cause the investment fund
manager's incentives to differ from the investors' desires, and it
eliminates deferral of the investment fund manager's inclusion of
gain. At the same time, it allows pass-through treatment for the
investment fund manager's economic investment in the fund.
B. Why the General Objections to Mark-to-Market Taxation Do Not
Apply to the Simplified Mark-to-Market Approach
As discussed above, a proposal such as section 710, which
changes the tax character of carried interest while continuing to tax
the carried interest only when income is realized, aggravates the
already extant lock-in problem. However, the issues with lock-in
would be ameliorated if the investment fund manager were taxed on
a mark-to-market basis. By taxing the allocation of carried interest
without regard to underlying realization, the investment fund
manager's compensation would no longer be subject to deferral.
Instead, she would be taxed as income accrued to her.
Although mark-to-market taxation best reflects Haig-Simons
income, there are two practical impediments to requiring people to
pay taxes on a mark-to-market basis. The first is valuation.
Commentators have argued that taxing carried interest on a mark-
to-market basis "could not function" because of valuation concerns
and concerns that the investment fund manager would manipulate
the value of portfolio investments. '55 The second is liquidity. The
155. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 38-39. These arguments are especially
strong with private equity funds, which invest in private companies for which
there is no market and therefore no reliable method of valuation. They are less
107
HeinOnline  -- 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 107 2010
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
fact that an investor's assets have appreciated does not mean that
the investor has cash available to pay the tax; mark-to-market
taxation could potentially force an investor to sell an appreciated
asset in order to have the money to pay the tax, even if she would
prefer to continue to hold the asset. Under the simplified mark-to-
market approach to taxing carried interest, however, the
investment-fund manager would not face either a valuation or a
liquidity problem.
1. Valuation
The simplified mark-to-market approach being proposed in this
Article would not require investment funds to value their assets
separately for tax purposes. Rather, the amount of an investment
fund manager's tax would be based on the fund's financial
accounting.
Because financial accounting and tax accounting have different
goals (to provide useful information to interested parties and to
provide for equitable collection of revenue, respectively), there is no
"presumptive equivalency" between financial accounting and tax
accounting. 56  Still, there is an incessant assertion that tax
accounting should follow financial accounting.'5 7 At the very least,
advocates of financial accounting for tax purposes argue that if tax
accounting followed financial accounting, corporations understating
their tax liabilities would also be required to understate their
profits, making shareholders unhappy."" Ultimately, though,
calculating income for tax purposes under financial-accounting
standards is arguably a bad idea and is unlikely to happen-the
government is unlikely to cede authority to determine taxable
income to anybody else.159
For purposes of implementing the proposed simplified mark-to-
market taxation of carried interests, however, it makes sense to
calculate the amount of carried interest based on an investment
fund's financial accounting. Investment funds already value their
assets in order to provide both investors and creditors with the
compelling for plain-vanilla hedge funds that invest principally in publicly
traded securities.
156. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1979).
157. Deborah A. Geier, The Myth of the Matching Principle as a Tax Value,
15 Am. J. TAX POL'Y 17, 19-20 (1998) ("Accountants typically argue that tax
accounting should simply follow financial accounting. Even some tax lawyers,
policymakers, and judges (and justices), insufficiently conscious of the tax
values that should inform tax accounting and with no formal background in
financial accounting, are often lulled into agreement with the rhetoric of the
financial accountants.").
158. Calvin Johnson, GAAP Tax, 83 TAx NOTES 425, 426 (1999).
159. See, e.g., id. ("Tax accounting ... [is] too important to be left to the
accountants.").
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information they require. 160
For hedge funds, the amount subject to mark-to-market
taxation would be the amount of carried interest allocated to them
every year for financial-accounting purposes. At least annually, a
hedge fund must determine the amount the fund's assets have
increased in value, 20% of which it allocates to the investment fund
manager and the remainder of which it allocates proportionally to
its limited partners. Under the simplified mark-to-market
approach, the investment fund manager would be treated as in fact
receiving the amount allocated to her and would be taxable on that
amount at ordinary rates.
Because private equity funds invest in illiquid assets for which
there is no public market, the valuation on the public equity side is
a little bit trickier. In addition, private equity fund managers are
not allocated their carried interest until the fund sells an
investment and receives the money. Nonetheless, private equity
funds create financial statements to provide to investors and
creditors, and the simplified mark-to-market system would use the
valuations in those financial statements in order to determine the
amount of carried interest subject to tax.
Admittedly, relying on the fund's valuation of its own assets
could invite manipulation of those values in order to reduce the
investment fund manager's tax bill. The investment fund manager
could, for example, choose to carry all investments at purchase price
until their sale, in which case the investment fund would only
calculate appreciation when assets were sold. If the investment
fund were to defer calculating appreciation, the investment fund
manager could defer any tax on carried interest under the simplified
mark-to-market proposal as long as it does under current law.
Alternatively, the investment fund manager could undervalue its
assets until sold, thereby deferring some portion of its tax until
realization.
Even if an investment fund manager were to defer all or a
portion of the tax on her carried interest, she would still be subject
to tax no later than she is taxed under current law. However, she
would be taxed at ordinary rates rather than at capital gains rates.
Because the policy considerations underlying preferential tax rates
on capital gains do not apply to carried interest, this still provides a
minor improvement over the current treatment of carried interests.
However, there are non-tax incentives for investment fund
managers not to understate the value of their assets. Although, as
privately held firms, investment funds are not subject to mandatory
financial reporting rules, most nonetheless rely on U.S. Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles. 16' These incentives are slightly
160. See Cumming, Gill & Walz, supra note 29, at 621.
161. Id.
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different for hedge funds and for private equity funds and are laid
out below.
Hedge funds have two main non-tax incentives to value their
assets generously. First, hedge fund managers are not allocated any
carried interest for financial-accounting purposes until the hedge
fund takes gains into account.162 When the hedge fund takes its
realized and unrealized gains into account, the hedge fund
manager's capital account is increased, which represents a real
increase in the manager's net worth, gain that the manager can
then withdraw from the fund. If the fund defers the allocation of
gains, any increase in the hedge fund manager's wealth is also
deferred.
Second, by deferring the allocation of unrealized gain, the
investors' capital accounts do not increase. In order to keep current
investors happy, and in order to market the fund to other potential
investors, it is presumably better to show a consistent increase in
the fund's assets and in investors' capital accounts. Moreover, if the
hedge fund were to fail to allocate appreciation to investors on a
regular basis, new investors who enter the fund after the
appreciation has occurred but before it is allocated to the old
investors would receive a portion of the appreciation that occurred
prior to their investing in the fund.'63  Such a result would be
unacceptable to early investors and, therefore, any hedge fund that
anticipates bringing in investors after the initial round of investors
would not, as a business matter, defer allocating unrealized
appreciation.
Private equity fund managers do not receive their carried
interest until the fund sells an asset.' In addition, a private equity
fund generally does not bring in additional investors after an initial
investment period.'65 However, private equity fund managers often
form additional private equity funds for which they need to raise
162. Illig, supra note 51, at 70-71.
163. As an example, let us return to Abby's investment fund. See supra Part
I.A. For the sake of this example, we can ignore any payments to Abby.
Assume that at the end of the year, the IBM stock has appreciated from $100 to
$110, but the $10 of appreciation is not allocated to Ben and Christy. On
January 1 of Year 2, Dave invests $50, which is used to purchase another $50 of
IBM stock (meaning that the fund owns $160 of IBM stock). Because the
appreciation was not allocated to Ben and Christy, their capital accounts have
remained at $50, and all three are equal partners. If the fund were to liquidate
the next day, Ben, Christy, and Dave would each receive $53.33, in spite of the
fact that the $10 of appreciation occurred before Dave purchased his interest. If
done correctly, the $10 of appreciation would have been allocated to Ben and
Christy on December 31 of Year 1, so each of them would have a capital account
of $55. If Dave bought his interest on January 1 of Year 2 and the fund were to
be liquidated on January 2, Ben and Christy would each receive $55 and Dave
would receive his $50 back.
164. Brennan & Okamoto, supra note 33, at 40.
165. See id. at 39-40.
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capital before the termination of existing funds. In order to market
the new funds both to existing and new investors, private equity
fund managers have incentives to overvalue their illiquid
investments that have not yet been sold. 166 As with hedge funds,
such business incentives to overvalue assets are in tension with any
tax incentives to undervalue assets.
Because of this tension between tax and non-tax incentives, it
seems unlikely that investment fund managers will significantly
undervalue their assets, even faced with a mark-to-market regime
on unrealized appreciation. Therefore, in spite of the valid
arguments for not basing tax accounting on financial-accounting
standards, in the case of imposing a mark-to-market system on
carried interest, it makes sense to use the financial-accounting
system an investment fund already uses in order to value its assets.
2. Liquidity
Although the simplified mark-to-market proposal does not
require an objective valuation of an investment fund's assets, the
investment fund manager does require cash to pay the annual tax.
Therefore, the simplification does not, itself, solve the general
liquidity concerns associated with mark-to-market taxation.1
Nonetheless, the simplified mark-to-market proposal would not
create liquidity issues for investment fund managers because, by the
nature of an investment fund manager's compensation, investment
fund managers always have sufficient liquidity to pay taxes imposed
on carried interest.
In general, the management fee alone would provide sufficient
cash to the investment fund manager to pay tax at ordinary rates on
any allocation of carried interest.' Return again to Abby's hedge
fund. It has $100 of invested capital and, for 2009, has a shockingly
good year, earning an 18% return (i.e., $18 of profit). The fund
charges investors a 2% management fee and 20% of the fund's
profits as carried interest. Abby will receive a management fee of $2
and will be allocated $3.60 of carried interest. Assuming that both
the management fee and the carried interest are subject to tax at a
35% rate, she will owe $0.70 of taxes on her management fee and
$1.26 of taxes on her carried interest, for a tax bill of $1.96. After
taxes, she will have $0.04 of cash left from the management fee (in
addition to the $3.60 by which her capital account in the fund has
increased). 169
166. Cumming, Gill & Walz, supra note 29, at 629.
167. See Brunson, supra note 56 (manuscript at 9).
168. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 37 ("Nor is liquidity a concern; the annual
management fees earned by private equity funds would provide more than
enough cash to pay the tax on an annual basis.").
169. Although only having $0.04 in cash left after taxes seems a miniscule
amount, an actual investment fund would begin with exponentially more assets
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Theoretically, there could be situations in which the
management fee was insufficient to cover the investment fund
manager's taxes. If Abby's hedge fund were to make slightly better
investments, increasing the fund's return by two percentage
points-a 20% profit-her total tax bill would be $2.10, $0.10 more
than the management fee she earned. Even in this situation,
however, Abby would have the liquidity to pay her tax bill.
Although the carried interest is just an allocation, if the investment
manager needs cash for whatever reason, she can cause the fund to
redeem a portion of her interest in the fund. 7 0
C. The Simplified Mark-to-Market Approach Is Straightforward
and Comports with the Parties' Understanding of the Structure of
Carried Interest
One problem with the cost-of-capital approach is that, while it
reflects the economics of carried interest, it adds steps and
complexity to the structure of the transaction.'7 ' While under the
tax law, the government may disregard a taxpayer's chosen form,'72
and although these added steps may accurately reflect one version of
the economics of the compensation of the investment fund manager,
the fact remains that the investment fund manager and the
investors have not chosen to adopt those steps. Moreover, while the
additional steps reflect the economics of carried interest, so do other
analogies, and there is no compelling reason why the cost-of-capital
analogy, with its added steps (i.e., a loan from the investors to the
investment fund manager, a contribution by the investment fund
manager to the fund, and the forgiveness of interest), should replace
the current treatment, which does not require any steps to be
imputed.
The simplified mark-to-market proposal, on the other hand,
merely eliminates the realization requirement.'7 3 Because there is
and, therefore, Abby would be left with exponentially more cash. If we were to
assume that Abby's fund had $100 million of invested capital, she would be left
with $40,000 cash after taxes, as well as an additional $3.6 million in her
capital account.
170. Ordower, supra note 9, at 358. Because a significant portion of a hedge
fund's assets are liquid, if the investment fund manager were to withdraw
money from her capital account, the fund could sell assets in order to have
money to distribute.
171. See supra Part IV.B.2.
172. See Kuper v. Comm'r, 533 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1976) ("As a general
rule, the incident of taxation depends on the substance rather than form of the
transaction.").
173. Perhaps it is audacious to say that the proposal "merely" eliminates the
realization requirement, which has been a fundamental part of the U.S. tax law
since before the enactment of the modern income tax. See David M. Schizer,
Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1549, 1551 n.2 (1998) ("The
[realization] rule is as old as the income tax itself."). But the realization
requirement is merely a tax accounting tool; it is not an actual transactional
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no realization requirement, it is necessary to impute a contribution
by the investment fund manager to the fund in order to account for
the fact that the carried interest remains invested in the fund. But
this imputed step comports with the transaction in which the
investment fund manager and the investors understand themselves
to be engaged. Moreover, taxing a taxpayer on income, even when
undistributed, and creating a deemed recontribution has a
significant history in corporate taxation, including in the taxation of
mutual funds.14
Because carried interest is an allocation of profits to the
investment fund manager, there is no physical distribution of cash
or other property to the investment fund manager. Instead, the
investment fund manager contributes her labor in exchange for an
interest in the fund. If the investment fund manager wishes to
receive cash for her labor instead of an interest in the fund, she
must cause the investment fund to make a distribution to her out of
her capital account."' Under the simplified mark-to-market
proposal, rather than requiring the investment fund manager to
take a distribution from her capital account, she is essentially
treated as first receiving a distribution (i.e., the carried interest) in
exchange for her labor and then contributing the cash to the fund in
exchange for an interest in the fund.
The tax law has no objection to treating investors as if they
received a distribution and then recontributed the money, even
where no cash changed hands. Mutual funds generally allow their
shareholders to participate in dividend-reinvestment plans. Under
a dividend-reinvestment plan, a shareholder can elect to receive
shares of the mutual fund in lieu of receiving a cash dividend. 176
Although the mutual fund investors may not feel like they have
realized any income,'77 they are treated as if they were in
constructive receipt of the dividend."'7  Effectively, then, a mutual
fund shareholder who elects not to receive distributions of cash in
favor of receiving additional shares of the mutual fund is taxed on a
mark-to-market basis.
Although a dividend-reinvestment plan applies to corporations,
there is no material difference between what happens in the mutual
fund context and what is happening in the partnership context-
rather than receiving a cash distribution of 20% of the fund's profits,
step. Thus, eliminating the realization requirement does less damage to the
form of the transaction than imputing steps.
174. See Terrence R. Chorvat, Perception and Income: The Behavioral
Economics of the Realization Doctrine, 36 CONN. L. REv. 75, 119-20 (2003).
175. Ordower, supra note 9, at 358.
176. Chorvat, supra note 174, at 121-22.
177. Id. ("It is likely that individuals therefore do not view these increases in
portfolio wealth as they would the receipt of cash.").
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-2(a)(1) (1973); Rev. Rul. 78-375, 1978-2 C.B. 130,
132.
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the investment fund manager has chosen to receive additional
interest in the fund. While the treatment of dividend-reinvestment
plans is not-and should not be-dispositive of the tax treatment of
carried interest, it demonstrates that the tax law is able and willing
to impute the single step of reinvestment to a transaction.
D. The Simplified Mark-to-Market Proposal Preserves Horizontal
Equity Between the Investment Fund Manager and the Investors
The simplified mark-to-market proposal effectively bifurcates
the investment fund manager's return. Allocations of carried
interest would be taxed annually at ordinary rates. However, after
being taxed, the carried interest would be treated as invested
directly in the fund, and any gains or losses on that amount would
get the pass-through character, and could potentially be long-term
capital gains.' As has already been discussed, though, the
reasoning behind the simplified mark-to-market proposal is that the
justifications for a preferential capital gains rate do not apply to the
investment fund manager's receipt of carried interest. Why, then,
should such preferential rates apply to other partnership allocations
made to the investment fund manager?
First, unlike the carried interest, once the appreciation is part
of the investment fund manager's capital account, it is legitimately
subject to risk; if the value of the fund's assets fall, the investment
fund manager's capital account will shrink, and she will suffer a
loss. Because the investment fund manager is subject to risk of loss
as well as potential for gain after being allocated the carried
interest, part of the justification for a preferential capital gains rate
applies to the investment fund manager with respect to her capital
account: she may not get to treat her losses in an equal and opposite
way from the way she treats her gains.
Second, horizontal-equity concerns weigh strongly in favor of
the investment fund managers being treated the same as the other
investors with respect to allocations of gain and loss resulting from
her capital account. Essentially, she is in the same position as the
passive investors: she has contributed (or been deemed to have
contributed) cash to the fund, which has increased the size of her
capital account.' And this investment by the investment fund
manager is made on an after-tax basis, just like the investments of
179. Even this comports with certain current mark-to-market rules. A
securities dealer subject to the mark-to-market rules of section 475 of the
Internal Revenue Code can opt out of such treatment for "any security held for
investment." I.R.C. § 475(b)(1)(A) (2006).
180. There are certain differences. For example, the investment fund
manager can generally withdraw capital from her capital account at any time.
Ordower, supra note 9, at 358. However, the investors can generally only
redeem their shares at certain times. Depending on the fund, it may be as
frequently as monthly or as infrequently as annually. Id. at 328.
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any other taxable investor.18 1
Third, and related to the first two points, is that the investment
fund manager could easily avoid a rule that taxed all partnership
allocations to her as ordinary income, irrespective of whether the
allocation was carried interest or investment interest. In order to
avoid the rule, all she would have to do would be to withdraw her
full capital account every time carried interest was allocated. Then
she could invest directly in the assets owned by the fund or she
could invest in another investment fund that she did not manage. 8 2
By investing directly or by investing through an alternative
investment fund, the investment fund manager would be subject to
the realization rules and capital rates applicable to other
investors.8 3
To the extent that the tax law encouraged the investment fund
manager to take her money out of the fund, the other investors
would be hurt. In order to have the cash available to make
distributions to the investment fund manager, the fund would have
to sell certain assets that it might otherwise prefer not to sell.
Losing the investment fund manager's money would also shrink the
fund's assets, diminishing the advantages that inhere in having a
large capital base. Furthermore, while allocations of carried
interest encourage the investment fund manager to make as much
profit for the fund as possible, where the fund has lost money,
carried interest may not provide sufficient incentive for the
investment fund manager to make up the loss.'84 Where the
investment fund manager's capital account has shrunk alongside
the capital accounts of the other investors, however, she is in the
same boat as the limited partners; having her own money in the
fund improves the alignment between the investment fund
manager's interests and the interests of the other investors.
Ultimately, once the investment fund manager has paid taxes in
respect of the allocation of carried interest, whatever she leaves in
181. Tax-exempt investors, of course, invest on a pretax basis. One objection
to the current treatment of carried interest (which would also apply to section
710) is that it would effectively allow an investment fund manager to purchase
interest in the fund using pretax dollars, because tax is only imposed upon
realization. See Fleischer, supra note 11, at 24 ("Rather than contribute after-
tax dollars to buy a capital interest, GPs can, instead, convert management
fees, on a pretax basis, into investment capital.").
182. The second option would appear to be less appealing than the first
because in another fund she would have to pay a management fee and incentive
allocation. She could, however, negotiate with the fund to reduce or exempt her
from the management fee and incentive allocation applicable to her investment
(possibly in return for doing the same for the investment fund manager of that
investment fund).
183. See Rosenzweig, supra note 28, at 727 ("If the GP owned shares of the
portfolio company directly, there is no doubt that the gain on sale would be
capital gain, except in limited circumstances.").
184. See Ordower, supra note 9, at 346-48.
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the fund represents a bona fide investment. There is no compelling
reason to treat that investment differently than the investment of
any other person.
E. The Simplified Mark-to-Market Approach Is Invisible to Passive
Investors
Although investment fund managers would be subject to
changed character and timing in the taxation of carried interest, the
changes made by the simplified mark-to-market approach would be
invisible to the investors. Because the simplified mark-to-market
proposal would make no changes to the taxation of other investors,
it would not add any administrative burden to computing their
taxes. Moreover, it would be administrable from their perspective,
because they would not be required to do anything different from
what they currently do. Because it is invisible to the other
investors, they should have no objection to enacting the simplified
mark-to-market proposal.
From the perspective of passive investors in an investment
fund, after the enactment of the simplified mark-to-market
approach, 20% of the fund's gains would continue to be allocated to
the investment fund manager. Professor Melone criticizes this
result on the grounds that it causes capital gains income to
disappear. 8 1 Professor Mark P. Gergen's proposal would solve this
disappearance problem by treating compensatory allocations as
salary, which would be income to the investment fund manager and
an expense to the investment fund.186 The investment fund would
then allocate to the investors gains (including the 20% currently
allocated to the investment fund manager) and, in addition, would
allocate to the investors their pro rata portion of the salary expense.
The following illustrates the difference between Professor
Gergen's approach and the simplified mark-to-market approach: 87
Assume that Abby's fund earns and realizes $100 of long-term
capital gains. Under the modified mark-to-market approach, Abby
would be allocated $20, which she would take as ordinary income,
and Ben and Christy would each be allocated $40 of long-term
capital gains. Under Professor Gergen's approach, on the other
hand, Abby would receive $20 of salary, treated as ordinary income.
Ben and Christy would each be allocated $50 of long-term capital
gains and $10 of compensation expense. Professor Melone finds the
recharacterization of $20 of capital gains as ordinary income to be
"anomalous because it is clear that capital gain has been generated.
If the service partner traded for her own account, the gain would be
185. Melone, supra note 20, at 478-79.
186. Gergen, supra note 19, at 103.
187. See also Melone, supra note 20, at 479 (demonstrating the difference
between I.R.C. § 710 and Professor Gergen's approach).
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characterized as capital gain. If the service partner is not allocated
capital gain, it should be allocated to someone else-it should not
disappear."88
It is not clear, however, why the capital gains should not
disappear. If preferential capital gains rates exist in order to correct
distortions otherwise created by the imposition of tax, where the
distortions do not exist, there is no reason why capital gains are
inherently different from other income and no reason why they must
always be preserved. Moreover, under current law, capital gains
can and do disappear. If, for example, the investment fund manager
(or, for that matter, any other investor) had made an election under
section 475(f) of the I.R.C. to be taxed on a mark-to-market basis,
any gains allocated to the investment fund manager (or electing
investor) would be treated as ordinary income, notwithstanding the
character of the income being passed through."' And for a dealer in
securities, ordinary treatment is mandatory, irrespective of whether
the dealer's counterparty treats the income as capital or ordinary.'
Nonetheless, by taxing the carried interest as ordinary income,
the simplified mark-to-market proposal is essentially treating
carried interest as salary. So why should the tax law not go all the
way and adopt Professor Gergen's approach? First, although the
carried interest is arguably closer to compensation for services than
it is to a partnership allocation, the fact remains that it is
structured as a partnership interest. Although the tax law can
disregard a taxpayer's chosen form in deciding how to tax a
transaction, 9' such line drawing adds complexity to the tax code.
Where the proper result can be achieved without adding that
complexity, it makes sense to use the simpler approach. There is a
long history of investment funds treating carried interest as an
allocation to the investment fund manager; it is an administrable
rule, and the principal justification for changing it from an
allocation to a salary (i.e., so that capital gains do not disappear) is
not so compelling as to demand the change be made, with the
attendant complexity added to the tax code.19 2
In addition, continuing to treat carried interest as an allocation
presents certain advantages to the passive investors. Because the
change is transparent to them, it does not involve any
administrative burden beyond what is already required of them.
Also, because it is an allocation, for tax purposes, investors are
188. Id.
189. I.R.C. § 475(d)(3)(A)(i), (f) (2006).
190. Id. § 475(a)(1).
191. Id. § 1259(c) (treating certain nonsale transactions as "constructive
sales" for tax purposes).
192. It is important that changes to the taxation of carried interest not be
made irresponsibly or hastily, inasmuch as "any change to the taxation of
carried interests could affect a large number of sectors in the economy."
Weisbach, supra note 20, at 727.
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treated as never having received that 20% of the investment fund's
profits, and are not taxed on it. While it is true that they would also
have an ordinary deduction for the salary paid to the investment
fund manager, their ability to take the deduction could be limited if
the fund is not engaged in a trade or business for tax purposes.193
And determining whether an investment fund is engaged in a trade
or business requires the investment fund to evaluate its activities
against a standard that is not completely clear. Moreover, it is
possible, depending on its activities, for an investment fund to be
engaged in a trade or business one year and not the next. 194
Beyond simplicity and following the form, treating passive
investors in a favorable (though fair) manner may be advantageous
to the enactment of carried interest reform. In spite of broad
agreement that something needs to be done about the taxation of
carried interests, until now, no reform has been passed."'9 Though it
is not clear why reform has failed so far, it is clear that investment
funds have opposed proposed reforms. 196 Among other things, funds
have asserted that, if the tax rate on carried interest were raised,
the additional tax cost would be passed on to passive investors. 17 If
the added tax costs were passed on to the investors,9 8 they
193. If the fund is engaged in a trade or business, the deduction for salary
paid would be fully deductible by the fund under section 162 of the I.R.C. The
deduction would pass through to partners, who would be able to deduct fully
their pro rata share of the salary expense. I.R.C. §§ 162, 702(a)(7) (2006);
Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a)(8)(i) (1960). However, if the fund were not engaged in a
trade or business, the expense would, instead, be deductible under section 212
of the I.R.C. I.R.C. § 212 (2006). It would still be passed through to the
investors, but, as a miscellaneous itemized deduction, would be subject to
several limitations. Id. §§ 67-68.
194. See Brunson, supra note 56 (manuscript at 23).
195. See Darryll K Jones, The Taxation of Profit Interests and the Reverse
Mancur Olson Phenomenon, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 853, 880 (2008) ("Ultimately,
efforts to reform the taxation of profit interests failed, despite having initially
been welcomed as necessary and long overdue.").
196. See Abrams, supra note 20, at 227 ("[Ilt could be that private equity
outfoxed reform-minded academics."); Jones, supra note 195, at 878 ("Obviously,
fund managers seek to maintain the status quo ante by which their
compensation income may be taxed at capital gains rates."); Andrew Ross
Sorkin, A Professor's Word on a Buyout Tax Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at
H8 ("The Private Equity Council has done a great job using sound bites to shape
the debate. It started out as a debate about the tax rates that wealthy fund
managers pay. Now it's about whether tax reform would hurt pensioners,
minorities, and destroy capitalism as we know it." (quoting Professor
Fleischer)).
197. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 195, at 879 ("These arguments were
essentially that if Congress actually reformed the law, fund managers would
either restructure their compensation arrangements to nevertheless obtain the
conversion which by that point would be clearly unintended, or would
expatriate themselves from the United States in order to avoid the tax.").
198. Note that it is far from clear that investment funds would (or even that
they would be able to) increase the rate of carried interest they charge
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presumably would also oppose any change in the treatment of
carried interests. If, however, investment funds were presented
with two proposals, one of which would add administrative burden,
income, and possibly a limited deduction to their taxes and the other
of which would be substantially invisible to them, those investors
may, if not support, at least not oppose legislation enacting a
simplified mark-to-market taxation of carried interest.
F. Practical Objections to Taxing Carried Interest at Ordinary
Rates
Even though taxing carried interests at ordinary rates rests on
a sound tax-policy footing, there are at least two unfavorable, albeit
non-tax-related, consequences that may occur. First, it is possible
that investment funds would leave the United States, taking both
their profits and their jobs with them.'99 Second, some argue that
the incidence of a tax increase would not fall on the investment fund
managers, but would, instead, be passed on to investors, decreasing
their return.200 If these objections are of any concern, empirical
research would be necessary to evaluate their truth and their scope.
Intuitively, however, neither appears to be a significant problem.
It seems unlikely that raising the rate of tax on investment fund
managers would drive funds offshore. Although this Article has
treated investment fund managers as if they were individuals, they
are generally entities, often limited-liability companies, that are
taxable as partnerships.20 ' Still, for the tax rate of carried interest
to matter, the ultimate recipient must be an individual who is
subject to U.S. taxes. Corporate taxpayers pay the same rate of tax
202
on ordinary income and long-term capital gains.
Although the investment fund manager could restructure itself
as a non-U.S. entity in reaction to an increased rate of tax on carried
interest, as long as the investment fund manager is taxable as a
investors. See infra Part V.F.
199. See Raymond Hernandez & Stephen Labaton, In Opposing Tax Plan,
Schumer Supports Wall Street over Party, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 2007, at Al
("[Senator Schumer] said a tax increase on private equity and hedge fund
executives could lead to an exodus of jobs and companies from New York, and
even from the country."); see also Jenny Anderson, For Schumer, the Double-
Edged Sword of Cozying Up to Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2007, at C6
("From that perspective, Mr. Schumer should logically be opposed to tax
increases on an industry that is already complaining it is losing ground to
overseas markets (yet making more money than it has ever made, but that's
another story).").
200. See Sarah Lueck, Minority Group Fights Carry Tax Increase, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 5, 2007, at A3 ("For example, the industries have argued that raising
taxes on managers would reduce returns for public pension funds that invest in
private-equity and hedge funds.").
201. Andrew W. Needham, A Guide to Tax Planning for Private Equity
Funds and Portfolio Investments (Part 1), 95 TAx NoTEs 1215, 1225 (2002).
202. I.R.C. § 11 (2006).
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partnership, its members would continue to be subject to higher
rates of tax imposed by reform. Even if the members wanted to
expatriate, they would be subject to U.S. taxation for ten years
following the loss of their citizenship.203 Moreover, recent
amendments to the I.R.C. are aimed to prevent investment fund
managers from deferring their income through offshore entities.204
Although certain administrative jobs may move offshore if
investment fund managers were to restructure as non-U.S. entities,
there would ultimately be minimal difference with respect to U.S.
jobs or U.S. tax revenues.
It is possible that if an investment in U.S.-based investment
funds were to cost more (thus reducing investors' returns), investors
would instead invest in non-U.S. funds. But the modified mark-to-
market proposal would not, in itself, raise the costs or lower the
return for investors. The only way their costs would be raised would
be if the investment fund managers were to raise the management
fee or rate of carried interest in order to recoup some or all of the
increased taxes they paid. And it is not a foregone conclusion that
investment funds would pass the cost of a tax increase on to their
investors. If an investment fund manager wanted to pass the cost of
a tax increase to her investors, she could do so by raising the
management fee or the amount of carried interest. But if an
investment fund manager believed that raising the management fee
or the rate of carried interest would drive investors to invest in
foreign investment funds, raising fees or carried interest would be
irrational.
Assuming that all of an investment fund's income was long-
term capital gains, the fund would have to increase the carried
interest from 20% to approximately 26% (so that it could maintain
an after-tax return of 17% of the fund's profits). 205 There is no
reason that, assuming there is robust competition between
investment funds for some finite amount of investment capital, some
203. Id. § 877(a)(1).
204. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Ira B. Shepard & Daniel L. Simmons,
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation: The Year 2008, 9 FLA. TAX
REV. 275, 340 (2009) ("Hammering employees whose deferred compensation
comes from offshore, i.e., hedge fund managers. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 added new Code § 457A, which provides that any
nonqualified deferred compensation ... under a plan of a nonqualified entity
must be included in gross income in the first year in which there is no
substantial risk of forfeiture.").
205. Under current law, if an investment fund earns $100 of long-term
capital gains in a year and allocates a 20% carried interest to its manager, the
manager would be allocated $20 before taxes. Because long-term capital gain is
taxable at a 15% rate, the investment fund manager would pay $3 in taxes ($20
x 0.15 = $3) and would have $17 ($20 - $3) in after-tax profit. If carried
interest were taxed instead at a 35% rate, the investment fund manager would
have to be allocated carried interest of approximately 26% in order to have the
same $17 of after-tax profit. $26 x 0.35 = $9.10; $26 - $9.10 = $16.90.
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investment funds would not maintain 20% carried interest in order
to undercut their competition and attract more investors. If the
fund could attract more investors and more invested capital, it could
increase its after-tax profit through volume rather than higher
carried interest. A fund with $100 of invested capital, a 10% return,
and 26% carried interest would be allocated $2.60 of carried interest
pre-tax and, at a 35% rate, would have $1.69 of carried interest after
taxes. In order to earn the same $1.69 after tax on the same 10%
return, assuming 20% carried interest, the fund would have to have
$130 of invested capital. It is at least feasible that, by imposing
carried interest that was 23% lower (especially if it provided a
comparable return), an investment fund could attract 30% more
invested capital.
It is true, however, that there have not been any significant
number of investment fund managers entering the current market
in order to undercut the rate of carried interest currently being
charged. It is not clear whether this is because of information
206
asymmetries, cartelization, or some other reason.26 However, it is
not readily apparent that investors would continue to accept
whatever fees and carried interest investment fund managers
charge if the rate of carried interest were suddenly radically raised.
As their returns have faltered, investment funds have lost some of
the mystique that may have convinced investors to accept their
terms unquestioningly in the past; there are already signs that, in
the future, investors may not accept higher carried interest just
because the investment fund managers want to charge higher
rates.207
If investors were to accept higher fees or carried interest,
though, presumably it would be because they felt the investment
fund manager's services were worth the additional six percentage
points. Any change would be transparent. If investors felt that the
investment fund manager's services were worth more than they
currently pay, it would be a fair and arm's-length change.20
CONCLUSION
It appears likely that Congress will change the taxation of
carried interests. The current preferential rates seem intuitively
206. See Sanchirico, supra note 126, at 1151.
207. See, e.g., Louise Story, Hedge Fund Glory Days Fading Fast, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2008, at C1 ("A prolonged downturn might prompt some
investors to rethink these investments or demand lower fees from managers,
who typically collect annual management fees of 2 percent and then take a 20
percent cut of any profits.").
208. That is to say, there is no compulsion in the investment market. An
investor in an investment fund could invest her money directly, for example, if
she felt that she could get a better return than the return (subtracting fees and
other costs) she gets through the investment fund.
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unfair, especially when the people receiving carried interest are
among the highest-paid people in the world. But to base a change
solely on the fact that investment fund managers can be wildly
financially successful, where there is no policy justification for such
change, would be to do violence to the tax code.
Previous commentary advocating a change in the taxation of
carried interest has largely been based on finding economic
equivalents to carried interest and taxing carried interest in
accordance with the equivalent. However, any analogy that
suggested that carried interest should be taxed as ordinary income
could be countered by an analogy that demonstrated that
investment managers were, in fact, investors in the fund and
deserved to be treated as such.
This Article has provided an alternate basis for reforming the
taxation of carried interest. Because the justifications underlying
the taxation of capital gains at preferential rates do not apply to
carried interest, it is unnecessary to determine what analogy is best;
provided that carried interest is taxed on a (simplified) mark-to-
market basis, there is no reason why it should be taxed at
preferential rates.
Analyzed closely, the practical objections to raising the rate of
tax on carried interest do not appear to significantly affect the policy
considerations. Although it is possible that some investment fund
activity will shift overseas and that some investors will pay more in
order to invest through funds, it is not clear that either will result
from raising the tax. And, to the extent either happens, investors
will be fully informed of both the fact that the change is occurring
and the consequences of the change.
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